The Arab-Israeli conflict: a study of global and regional interaction by Kortanek, Gregory M.
THE ARAB - ISRAELI CONFLICT:







THE ARAB - ISRAELI CONFLICT:





Thesis Advisor: J. W. Amos, II





SeCURlTY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PACE (Whtt Datm Snlmr»d)
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM
t. REPORT NUMBER 2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtltim)
The Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Study of Global
and Regional Interaction
5. TYPE OF REPORT ft PERIOD COVERED
Master's Thesis;
June 1978
• PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AuTHORf*;
Gregory M. Kortanek
• CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERC«>
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASK
AREA « WORK UNIT NUMBERS





O. NUMBER OF PAGES
176
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME * ADDRESSC// dHUrwnt /ram Conlrollint Ofllet) IS. SECURITY CLASS, (ol ihit riport)
l»«. DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION iTAT HMEH J (ol thia Report)
Approved for public release; distr ibution unliraite d.
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol th» mbttrmet untmrmd In Bloek 20, II dlllmrtnt Irom Hsport)
IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES




20. ABSTRACT (Contlnu* on rovtrto tid* II nacacaarr and Idontlty by block numbor)
This study of the Arab - Israeli conflict traces its historical development
in the context of an evolving international system. Numerous examples
have been used to illustrate the changing manner in which the core dispute
of the Middle Eastern regional subsystem has influenced or been influenced
by the global system. The trend which emerges is towards an increasingly
subsystem dominant relationship between the global and the regional actors.








SeCUBlTY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (Whon Data Knlorad]

Unclassified
jeCuWITv CL ASSI^'C ATIOM Of THIS OAQECWSan n>»» Kniur»J
20. (continued)
policies of the major systemic actors, (2) the increasing systemic dependency
upon Middle East Oil, and (3) the growing sense of political independence
amongst the regional actors. The study concludes that the Arab - Israeli
conflict can only be resolved within the framework of the essential rules of
behavior of the subsystem, and that a systemically imposed settlement is
unlikely. Some United States policy alternatives are suggested which are







$CvU»»lTV CLASliriCATlON Of THIS P kQlfWh* •<*>

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
The Arab - Israeli Conflict:
a Study of Global and Regional Interaction
by
Gregory M. Kortanek
Captain, United States Air Force
B,S,, Northwestern University, 1967
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of









DEFINITIONS PECULIAR TO THIS STUDY 12
RESEARCH FORMAT 13
NOTES I - 15





III. THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT: A SYSTEM DOMINANT
"BALANCE OF POWER" INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 27
THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT 28
ZIONISM AND THE WESTERN POWERS 31
WARTIME POLITICAL MANEUVERING 36
THE BALFOUR DECLARATION 38
DEVELOPING PATTERNS OF MUTUAL EXPLOITATION 41
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MANDATE 43
NOTES III 47

IV. SUBSYSTEMIC CHALLENGES TO A DISINTEGRATING
"BALANCE OF POWER" SYSTEM 51
THE ARAB REBELLION -- 52
THE PEEL COMMISSION 54
PROTOTYPE OF CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST
NEGOTIATIONS 56
REGIONAL REACTION 58
MOBILIZATION OF ZIONIST FORCES 59
WORLD WAR II 62
THE DEVOLUTION OF BRITISH POWER IN PALESTINE 65
THE UNITED NATIONS AND PALESTINE 66
THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 69
THE FIRST ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 70
THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 75
NOTES IV --- -- 80
V. DEFINED SUBSYSTEMIC CHALLENGES TO A BIPOLAR/
POLITICALLY DISCONTINUOUS INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM - 84
ARAB POLITICS AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY 84
EFFECTS OF THE 1948 WAR ON THE "CONFRONTATION
STATES" 85
Jordan 85




THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISRAELI NATIONAL ACTOR 89
CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 91
CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 92
THE SUEZ CONFLICT 95
SUEZ AFTERMATH: SOME THOUGHTS ON LINKAGE
POLITICS 102
1956-1967 105
THE THIRD ROUND 114
EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON REGIONAL/SYSTEMIC
RELATIONS 116
NOTES V 119
VI. EMERGING PATTERNS OF SUBSYSTEM DOMINANCE 124
TERRITORIAL THRUSTS AND DIPLOMATIC PARRIES 124
ARMS TRANSFERS AND THE WAR OF ATTRITION
1968-1971 --- - 128
THE WAR OF THE DAY OF ATONEMENT 132
THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR 140
SUBSYSTEMIC DOMINANCE 141
MIDDLE EAST OIL --- 143
ARMS TRANSFERS REVISITED 147
SUBSYSTEMIC POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE 150
NOTES VI 158
VII. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES l6l
ARMS TRANSFER POLICY 164
NEED FOR AN AMERICAN ENERGY POLICY 165

PROSPECTS FOR AN ARAB - ISRAELI PEACE 167
NOTES VII - 170
VII. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 171
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 176

ABSTRACT
This study of the Arab - Israeli conflict traces its historical develop-
ment in the context of an evolving international system. Numerous ex-
amples have been used to illustrate the changing manner in which the core
dispute of the Middle Eastern regional subsystem has influenced or been
influenced by the global system. The trend which emerges is towards an
increasingly subsystem dominant relationship between the global and the
regional actors. The factors identified as influencing this trend are (1)
the arms transfer policies of the major systemic actors, (2) the increasing
systemic dependence upon Middle East Oil, and (3) the growing sense of
political independence amongst the regional actors.
The study concludes that the Arab - Israeli conflict can only be re-
solved within the framework of the essential rules of behavior of the sub-
system, and that a systemically imposed settlement is unlikely. Some
United States policy alternatives are suggested which are designed to




The mutual antipathy which has characterized modern Arab- Jewish
relations has endured since the time of the first Alliyah of 1882, through
two world wars, the transformation of the international social system,
the Arab Revolt, the establishment of the state of Israel, and the emer-
gence of the global superpowers. Numerous attempts have been made by
both regional and extra-regional actors to mollify the antagonists and to
achieve lasting peace and stability in the Middle East region. Yet, despite
the transitory euphoria which has accompanied the more dramatic of these
attempts, the conflict remains intractable. This very persistence of the
conflict provides some indication of its profundity and complexity. The
problem is so complex, moreover, that any attempt to catalogue, much
less interpolate, the many interwoven factors (often normatively charged)
which have been described in the literature would produce a work which is
both unwieldly, and of little value to the decision noaker. Consequently,
this paper will attempt to objectively analyze the dispute as a process
susceptible to the abstractions which systems theories enable.
This paper is drawn in major part from the concepts expounded and
defined by Morton Kaplan in his System and Process in International
Politics. Some modifications of Kaplan's theory and definitions have
been made in order to accommodate the purposes to which this paper has
been directed. The following few pages, therefore, will briefly summarize

some of the basic relevant definitions and assumptions used by Kaplan,
as well as indicating what adaptations have been made by this author in
his use of Kaplan's concepts.
SYSTEMS
According to Kaplan, a system of action may be defined thus:
"... a set of variables so related, in contra-
distinction to its environment, that describable
behavioral regularities characterize the internal
relationships of the variables to each other and the
external relationships of the set of individual var-
iables to combinations of external variables. "
This set may then be analyzed in terms of its "state" - a description of
the variables of the system. The state is described when the observer
has delineated the system's "essential rules" and its "transformiation
rules, " when the actors in the system have been classified, and when
capability and information factors have been delineated.
Kaplan goes on to define political systems as those which are distin-
guished by the fact that their rules:
".
. . specify the areas of jurisdiction for all other
decision making units and provide methods for
settling conflicts of jurisdiction. "
Conversely, where no supreme delimiter of jurisdictional competences
exists, there is no political system. Kaplan therefore denies political
4
nature to an international normative order:
"Since no arbiter is available to keep jurisdictional
disputes within any given bounds, the system lacks
full political status. In the present international
system, the nation states have political systems,
but the international system lacks one. Alter-
natively, the international system may be charac-




Political systems may be classified into two types: system domixiant
or subsystem dominant. Furthermore, they may be either directive or
non-directive in character. The first qualification is based upon economics.
In an open market environment, an individual actor is unable to influence
the price level by his own actions. In other circumstances - an oligopolistic
market for example - the actions of one actor may have an appreciable
effect upon the terms of trade. In the case of political systems, the distinc-
tion is the degree to which individual actors in the system, or its subsys-
tems, are able to change the system's "essential rules. "
"The political system is dominant over its sub-
systems to the extent that the essential rules of
the political system act as parametric "givens"
for any single subsystem. A subsystem becomes
dominant to the extent that the essential rules of
the system cannot be treated as parametric givens
for that subsystem. "
It should be noted that in the above quotation Kaplan has explicitly
referred only to political systems as being system or subsystem dominant.
However, he then goes on to describe the international system in these
terms:
"The international system - as it has been known
for the past several hundred years - tends toward
the subsystem dominant role. However, there are
a number of major or essential subsystems, namely
the major national states, which enter into an equilib-
rium somewhat like that of an oligopolistic market. "
For the purposes of this paper, the seeming contradiction in ascribing
the attributes of a political system to the international system which
11

Kaplan describes as lacking a political system will be ignored. Further-
more, the second distinction, referring to the directive or non directive
character of the system will also be explored only in passing, as the need
arises.
DEFINITIONS PECULIAR TO THIS STUDY
Accepting Kaplan's statement that "The system consists of the var-
9
iables under investigation. It has no absolute status, " this paper will
utilize terminology unique to its purposes. Therefore in the context of
this study, the international system will consist of that set of relationships
between the major national and supra-national actors as may have a pro-
found effect upon the essential rules of the system. Consequently, the
question of whether the present system contains a political system in the
sense of an arbiter of jurisdiction araongst the actors in the system is not
addressed. The international systein, therefore, requires the participa-
tion of those "essential national actors" which Kaplan describes in his
"Balance of Power" system as well as the other national or supra-national
actors who interact with them. In a "Loose Bipolar Bloc'^ system, these
"systemic" actors consist of the leaders of the respective blocs, as well as
those actors which are able to exercise independent influence upon the ac-
tions of the bloc actors. Other national and supra-national actors play two
roles simultaneously. They are coupled to the global system by means of
their relationships with the systemic actors. On the other hand, to the extent
that their external relations are amongst actors in the same geographic and
economic spheres, they are subsystemic actors.
12

A system dominated international system refers to that system in
which the essential actors (either major national actors or leading bloc
actors) are able to influence and constrain the behavior of non essential/
non bloc actors within their geographic, economic, or political subsystems.
Conversely, a subsystem dominated system refers to that system in which
the subsystemic actors interract with the systemic actors according to the
essential behavioral rules of the subsystem on issues concerning the
internal activities of their particular subsystem and its relation to the
larger system.
It should be noted that the notion of dominance is treated in this paper
12
in a manner somewhat akin to Oran Young's political discontinuity model,
since it "stresses the importance of both the systemwide and the regional
factors and emphasizes the complex patterns of their interpenetration,
leaving room for shifting weights with regard to the question of which type
of factor is dominant .... The discontinuities model .... focuses on the
13
complex interpenetrations between universal and regional issues . . . . "
RESEARCH FORMAT
This paper will trace the Arab - Israeli conflict through the trans-
formation of the international system from the "Balance of Power" type
which existed prior to the First World War, through the Loose Bipolar
System which emerged after the Second World War, to the perhaps "Very
14
Loose Bipolar System" or "multipolar" system which exists today.
Further, an attempt will be made to demonstrate the shifting patterns of

dominance, from system dominant, through subsystemic challenge, to
subsystem dominant. Finally, soine policy implications cf the current
subsystemically dominated relationship of the United States to the regional
subsystem will be discussed.
Before beginning an historically ordered survey, however, a brief
outline of some of the cognitive aspects of the dispute -- aspects which
are in large part responsible for the uniqueness of the Middle East sub-
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4. Kaplan's basic definition of the political follows a legal approach.
The political system is first a body of rules, and therefore a normative
order.
5. Kaplan, p. 14, Emphasis added.
6. The "Essential Rules" describe the general behavior of the actors.
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II. COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF THE DISPUTE
In recent years, much has been written by experts in the field of
international relations concerning the role of cognition, or perception in
relations among nations. It appears now that these relations are, in a
large measure, based upon what people think they are: the gap between
reality and imagination sometimes assuming great, and possibly dangerous
1
proportions. When decision makers carry their fictions into the global
arena and respond to them rather than to objective reality, the chances
for rational and pragmatic policies decrease. Misperceptions affect
domestic politics as well, but they are, because of more tenuous lines of
communications and usually only partial feedback, much more likely in
international politics. Several recent studies have shown that struggles
between the most powerful nations in the contemporary world were con-
ducted substantially in the realm of fantasy, further straining already
2
great tensions and blocking avenues of accommiodation. Conducted on
the basis of unrealistic and often prejudicial perceptions of adversaries
and self, struggles of powers thus assumed certain anomic, disorienting
qualities. The inability to accurately predict an opponent's behavior
normally leads to a retrenching of previously stated positions and furthers
rigidity, since the incentive for maintaining accepted beliefs, however at
variance from reality, lead^ to a disregard for conflicting evidence. The
curious intransigence on the part of the regional protagonists in the Middle
16

East confrontation between Arab and Jew can perhaps be partly explained
by this phenomenon.
HISTORICAL DESTINY
One of the major complications of any discussion concerning the Arab-
Israeli conflict is the fact that neither side is capable of viewing itself or
its adversary with any measure of objectivity. Traditional concepts of
mediation and compromise are not operative in the confrontation environ-
ment because of the special place in which each protagonist holds both
himself and his "enemy. " Both the Arabs and the Israelis have exhibited
a common tendency to view themselves in a very special historical role.
Unlike the nationalism that has influenced Europe and North America over
the past century, the conflicting nationalisms of the Middle East seem to
conceptualize the roles of their respective peopls as that of playing out
historically ordained roles in human destiny.
At the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict are the claims of two Semetic
peoples to the same land. According to Hebrew Tradition, the Lord God
promised Abraham: "And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee,
the land wherein Thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an ever-
4
lasting possession. " Unfortunately, both the Jews and the Arabs claim
Abraham as a common forefather. Consequently, it is felt that Ellis
errs when he states that, "The Arab connection to Palestine began centu-
ries after the Jews had been thrust out. In the seventh century A, D. ....
"Without even exploring the factual aspect of the statement, it seems

clear that the Arabs perceive their claim to Palestine to be at least co-
incidental with the claims of the Israelis. On the other hand there has
been some discussion concerning the possibility that the European Zionists
have no claim as heirs to the promise to Abraham and, in fact, are not a
6
Semitic people at all. The point of course is that, for the participants
in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the truth, and consequently, the righteous-
ness of their position, lies not with objective historicism, but with their
respective ethnic myths.
RELIGIOUS IRREDENTISM
Consequently, the irredentism which attends the Arab- Israeli dispute
is less the result of a political dislocation of a people from the land which
they had previously occupied, but a separation of a people (whether Jew
during the diaspora, or Palestinian Arab today) from a land inextricably
linked with its basic religious tenents. As Lichtenstadter states:
"One might think religion and politics to be incompat-
ible, but in the history of the Near and Middle East,
from time immemorial religion and the state idea
were closely allied. They were, in fact inter-
changeable, almost identical.
"In ancient Egypt, the king was god and god was the
king, and the land itself was linked to king and
god . . .
"In ancient Israel we have the same close con-
nection between religioun and the ruler. The
King of Israel was guided by God .... Muhammed,
the Prophet of Islam, continued in the same vein
insofar as he was conscious of having been called
God to reveal God's word to his people. "
18

This shared, while mutually exclusive claim to the land, helps explain
a paradoxical aspect of the dispute: although both sides evidence great
hostility towards one another, the majority of their attitudes tend to
8
parallel each other. Further, Kerr states that while all nationalisms
are, in a sense, religions based upon political aspirations and perceptions,
Jewish and Arab nationalisms have arisen out of their respective religious
traditions and are, perhaps, "as much unbroken extensions as surrogates
of religious sentiment. This may help account for the special measure of
9
self-righteousness by which both sides distinguish themselves. "
MUTUAL NON RECOGNITION
Some indication of the perceptual chasm which separates the opposing
factions in this dispute may be derived from the following two quotations
regarding the problem of the Palestinian refugees and their claim to the
land:
"I do not deny that the Arabs of Palestine will neces-
sarily become a minority in the country of Palestine.
What I do deny is that this is a hardship. That is not
a hardship on any race, any nation possessing so many
national states and so many more national states in the
future. One fraction, one branch of the race, and not
a big one, will have to live in someone else's state;
well that is the case with all the mightiest nations of
the world. I could hardly mention one of the big
nations, having their states mighty and powerful, who
had not one branch living in someone else's state.
That is only normal and there is no "hardship" attached
to that. So when we hear the Arab claim confronted
with the Jewish claim - I fully understand that any
minority would prefer to be a majority. It is quite
understandable that the Arabs of Palestine would also
prefer Palestine to be the Arab state No. 4, 5 or 6 -
that I quite understand but when the Arab claim is
confronted with our Jewish demand to be saved, it is




"I begin to lose my patience and my sense of ration-
ality. I begin to feel that our lives are not worth
living anywhere in the world, anywhere. It is impos-
sible for me to be oblivious of my situation; to be, as
it were, happy. Moments of gloom and fury overwhelm
my being as I spend restless days in Paris and I see
pictures of robust Israelis tilling our land, growing our
oranges, inhabiting our cities and towns, co-opting our
culture, and talking in their grim, stubborn way about
how we do not "exist" and how our country was a
"desert" before they went there. And I gag with anger
and mortification . . .
"After twenty-five years of living in the ghourba, of
growing up perpetually reminded of my status as an
exile, the diaspora for mie, for a whole generation of
Palestinians, becomes the homeland. Palestine is no
longer a mere geographic entity but a state of mind.
The reason however, that Palestinians are obsessed
with the notion of Returning, though indeed there is
no Palestine to return to as it was a quarter-century
before, is because the Return means the reconstitution
of a Palestinian's integrity and the regaining of his place
in history. It is not merely for a physical return to
Palestine that a lot of men and women have given or
dedicated their lives, but for the right to return of
1 1 —
—
which they have been robbed. "
"While it may be difficult for an objective observer to equate the im-
passioned statement of Turki to Jabotinsky's claim that the Palestinians
endured no "hardship, " the preceding examples are but indicative of the
caricaturized images to which each side ascribes its adversary. In gen-
eral, there has been little serious inquiry on the part of members of one
side into the reality, character, and modus vivendi of the other. The
problem is basically one of mutual non-recognition. This non-recognition
goes beyond the merely political aspects of diplomatic recognition and
' touches on the problem of each side failing to recognize the other's
I
existence as three dimensional human beings like themselves. Instead,

we find Arabs tending to think of Jews as Zionist pawns of Western colonial-
ism whose only goal in Palestine is "expansionism, " and each Israeli
retaliatory raid, and each Arab-Israeli war has strengthened that belief.
Consequently, there is widespread belief amongst the Arabs that "the only
thing the Israelis understand is force, " and since they cannot be brought
to reason, the only alternative is to wait until Israel's foreign patrons,
particularly the United States, decrease their support, both political and
12
financial.
Because of this belief in the Israeli goal of expansion, the Arabs also
view with concern the Jews living outside the borders of Israel. Should
the Zionists succeed in attracting the Jews to immigrate to Israel, the
borders would have to be expanded simply to accommodate them.
Because of these stereotyped images perceived by the Arabs, there
is a certain lack of curiosity on their part about their Jewish neighbors.
Although the internal political system of Israel is made up of divergent
factions, the Arab view of Israel tends more toward that of a unitary
rational actor, and a malevolent one at that.
From the Israeli point of view, the question of non-recognition centers
on the case of the Palestinian refugees, and the issue of whether or not
they constitute a nation. The most prevalent position amongst Israeli
officialdom is that the Palestinians can only be recognized as Arab indiv-
iduals who happened to live in the area designated as a British mandate
before 1948; as a result, their future lies as individuals to be assimilated
13into surrounding Arab states and not as a political entity.
21

This non-recognition of a viable Palestinian nation is a logical re-
sponse to the Palestinians' non-recognition of the right of Jewish immigra-
tion during the mandate period. Further, recognition of a Palestinian
Arab nation separate from that which the Israelis already claim exists as
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would limit the options available to the
Israelis on the politically sensitive issue of the disposition of the occupied
territories of the West Bank and the Gaza strip.
Kerr attributes this Israeli non-recognition of a Palestinian Arab
nation as going much deeper than practical politics and involving the
psychological needs of the Israelis to justify their continued immigration
into the mandated territory and the displacement of the Palestinian Arabs,
despite the Balfour Declaration's admonition that "... nothing shall be
done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
14
Jewish communities in Palestine ..." This justification came as the
result of minimizing the social and national reality of Arab Palestine.
It is easier, consequently, for the Israelis to perceive of the Palestinians
as an unfortunate, non-political mass of people, manipulated by their own
leaders, who fled in 1948 for unnecessary reasons and who are more
logically destined for assimilation into neighboring states than for re-
patriation to their former home.
If there is a problem of non-recognition amongst the regional parties
of the conflict, this problem is even more profound amongst the Jewish
communities outside Israel, particularly in the United States, where
distance and cultural barriers make it difficult to think of the Middle East
22

other t±ian in terms of Israel's problems and interests. This factor is
significant, and will be touched on later in this paper, when the domestic
factors influencing the United States' attitude toward the Arab-Israeli
conflict are discussed.
As for the rest of the Arab world, the Israeli counterpart of the
Arab's view of them as expansionist, is the Israeli view that the Arabs
are "exterminationist, " and that this 100 million Arab fanatics lie in wait
for the proper moment at which to strike and at which to "push the Israelis
into the sea. " This view of Arab intentions is expressed by Yigal AUon
as follows:
"But of primary importance are the subjective asym-
metric factors affecting relations between the two
sides. In this respect, there is absolute polariza-
tion. Whereas the Arab states seek to isolate,
strangle and erase Israel from the world's map,
Israel's aim is simply to live in j^eace and good
relations with all its neighbors, mT5
As a result of the Israeli's perception of the Arabs as failing to
possess the complexities and diverse interests which one might normally
ascribe to a collection of over 130 million people in 2 1 states, there is a
lack of curiosity on the Israeli side concerning the Arabs which tends to
parallel the aforementioned Arab lack of curiosity concerning the Israelis.
As long as the major protagonists in this dispute tend to view each other
in these stereotypical terms, the prospects for genuine movement towards
a negotiated settlement of differences and the establishment of peace and
normal relations between states appear dim. This is especially so if one
23

expects the progress towards peace to occur totally within a regional
framework and with no extra regional involvement.
The above discussion was intended to demonstrate the emotionally
and normatively charged atmosphere within which subsystemic inter-
action occurs. In the following chapters an historical survey, utilizing
some of the tools of systems theory, will characterize the various types
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III. THE ORIGINS OF CONFLICT :
A SYSTEM DOMINANT "BALANCE OF POWER" INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
As the seeds of the present Arab-Israeli dispute were being sown,
from approximately the last half of the nineteenth century until about 1935,
events within the Middle Eastern regional subsystem were being shaped
and directed by extra-regional powers. These powers operated within
an international system to which Kaplan appended the appellation "Balance
of Power. " Within this system the actors are international actors of the
subclass "national actor, " some of whom (at least five or more) are con-
1
sidered "essential. " Kaplan does not define "essential, " however,
within the context of this paper essential actors will be synonornous with
"systemic actors, " that is those actors whose foreign policy output may
influence the behavior of other international actors outside of the geo-
graphic, economic, or political region of the systemic actor.
At the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, the
dominant Middle East regional actor, made its first attempts at joining
the exclusive group of systemic actors. The Empire was at war with
Russia and Austria; consequently it concluded treaties with Sweden,
which was also at war with Russia, in 1789, and Prussia, which could
apply pressure on Austria, in 1790. In 1798, the Empire joined a co-
alition against the menace of the French Revolution. Throughout the
nineteenth century, the Empire, in decline, allied itself with France,
27

Britain, and finally Germany, in an attempt to defend itself froin Russia,
which it considered its natural enemy, and which indeed continued to
2
display aggressive behavior.
Thus, it may be seen that the behavior of the Ottoman Turks was in
conformance with the essential rules of the "balance of power" system,
as they formed alliances and shifted loyalties in order to advance their
national interests. Nonetheless, the power of the Empire continued to
decline, pressured as it was from both without and within. Consequently,
although the Empire may have initially evidenced the behavior and power
of an essential actor, it is clear that it was not viewed as such by the
western systemic powers. Rule six of Kaplan's system calls for the
essential actors to permit a defeated or constrained essential actor to
reenter the system as an acceptable role partner, or to bring some
3
previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification.
Rather than do this, however, the Ottoman Empire was eventually to be
carved up out of existence by the other essential actors, and the power
vacuum left by its disappearance filled by those very powers.
At the very time that the Ottoman Empire was shrinking and be-
coming increasingly ineffective both a regional and a systemic actor, a
new actor was emerging, a supranational actor, born in Europe, destined
to play a major role in the Middle East subsystem.
THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT
In nineteenth century Europe, feelings of nationalism among
4European Jews began to take on concrete manifestations. Kedourie
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states that "Natioxialism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the begin-
ning of the 19th century, " yet the principle may reach back at least as
far as the time of Saul, the first Hebrew King. As the century progressed,
and the Jews prospered, hostility towards themi began to increase. As
5
Boulding points out a possible reaction to a threat is avoidance, or the
principle that the capability of threat is a declining function of the dis-
tance of the threatener from the threatened. He suggests that one might
interpret the foundation of Israel, in part, as a move to increase the
distance between Jews and their possible threateners. In addition, the
nineteenth century European nationalist movements made Jews aware of
the analogies between nationalism and the traditional Jewish self-image.
The nationalistic uprisings of the central and Eastern Europeans, for
example, were a stimulus for arguments that the divinely appointed tiine
had come for the Jews to seek their own liberation also - by returning
6
to the traditional Holy Land.
On 3 March 1881, Czar Alexander II of Russia was assassinated.
The murder fanned the smoldering embers of anti-semitism and a new
series of Pogroms was begun. Eventually, over 160 Russian cities
7
would be devastated. Jewish communities were harassed by the "May
Laws, " a set of loosely interpreted, restrictive laws against the Jews
by which they could be evicted from their homes, businesses, schools,
8
and towns. Multitudes of Jews fled Russia, and, of these, thousands
fled to Palestine. The first "wave" or Alliyah, as the Jews later began
to call the large groups of immigrants to Palestine, was thus the result
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of the pogroms which flooded Russia in 1881. These pogroms were to
be the major impetus behind the Hovevie Zion, or "lovers of Zion"
organization, which looked upon the resettlement of Palestine as the
9
fundamental condition for the rejuvenation of the Jewish people. The
mass return of the Jews to their homeland had begun, and the seeds of
what we now call the Arab-Israeli conflict had been sown.
It was during the period of the first AUiyah that the Zionist move-
ment began to grow to maturity. Theodore Herzl emerged as the move-
ment's leader. He was convinced that the gentiles would never permit
the Jews to be assimilated into Western European society. As long as
they remained a minority, he reasoned, and subject to the political p
policies of a people who could change in but a few years from friend to
enemy, the Jews could expect only a continuation of the suppressed
existence they had endured for centuries. His Per Judenstaat (the Jewish
State) was written with the objective of stirring Jews to action. He was
instrumental in organizing the First Zionist Congress at Basle,
10
Switzerland, in August, 1897. At this conference, attended by hundreds
of Zionists, Herzl's personality united and mobilized the previously
11
inchoate group into action. The result of this nneeting was the Basle
Program, the ultimate goal of which was the creation in Palestine of a
12homestead for the Jewish people secured by public law.
Note the elasticity of the wording. The convention called for a
homestead "Heimstatte" secured by "public" law. This vagueness was
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designed to forestall international complications as well as to unite
diverse factions within the Zionist movement. Herzl had convinced the
congress to say "public law" for the Ottoman Sultan would have read
13
"international law" as a call to dismember his empire. It appears,
however, that the use of the term "public law" also entails the question
of whose public law. It is felt that this wording recognized the premise
that if the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine were to be sanc-
tioned by the public law of an essential actor, it would have the capa-
bility to impose that goal on the subsystemic actors. In a "balance of
power" international system there is no "international law" other than
that which can be imposed by the dominant states upon the dominated.
Thus, the emerging Zionist movement may be seen as prefiguring
the present day concept of International non- Governmental Organiza-
13
tions (INGO's). It emerged as a diffuse supra-national actor closely
coupled with the internal political systems of the various national actors
from whose populations its memberships was drawn.
ZIONISM, AND THE WESTERN POWERS
Zionism, as an emerging international actor, conformed well to the
essential rules of the Balance of Power system. Although not an es-
sential power itself, it proceeded to form a pattern of shifting alliances
based upon which of the essential powers was conceived as increasing
its influence over the international system. This behavior closely
parallels that required by the first essential rule: "Act to increase
capabilities but negotiate rather than fight. "
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"The urgent task of the 1880s and 90 's was one
which fell far short of the Zionist ideal and yet
was fundamental to the activities of both the
Eastern Zionists and the Western Jews: merely
to keep the doors of Palestine open to Jewish
immigrants and procure the right to buy land and
settle it. All was agreed in their willingness to
adopt any legal or semi legal arrangement or subter-
fuge that would accomplish these ends in the Ottoman
1 c
Empire. ' -^
With the publication of Der Judenstaat, there was both a polarizing
and a mobilizing effect upon the world Jewish community. The Jews
were threatened with increased anti-Semitism because of its postulate
that Jews could not assimilate. Further, its emphasis upon a statehood
which would arise in an area - preferably Palestine - which would be
either granted or sold by an imperial power, added to distrust of the Jews
amongst the subject territories. On the other hand, Herzl's influence
had led to a merger of what was previously an Eastern European move-
ment with Westerners of Herzl's persuasion, and Palestinian settlers.
As a result of this nnerger, the Zionist movement began to favor direct
diplomatic intervention with the sultan so as to secure "an open agree-
ment by which autonomous Jewish colonization of Palestine on a larger
1 7
scale might take place. " One factor which was ignored, however,
was that Arabs, like other national groups within the Ottomon Empire,
were already challenging the very basis of the Porte's claim to dominate
its various national components.
The first essential actor to which the Zionists turned in search of
support was Germany. In October 1898 Herzl wrote:
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"To live under the protection of strong, great,
moral, splendidly governed and thoroughly
organized Germany is certain to have most
salutary effect upon the national character of the
Jews. Also, at one stroke we should obtain a
completely legalized internal and external status.
The suzerainty of the Porte and the protectorate
under Germany surely ought to be adequate legal
underpinning. "
At a time when Germany was drawing close to the Ottoman Empire,
the likelihood of successful German influence with Constantinople seemed
most encouraging. During a meeting of Herzl and Friedrich, Grand Duke
of Baden, and uncle of the Kaiser, the Grand Duke revealed some of the
secret imperial designs of the Kaiser. The Kaiser's pilgrimage to the
Holy Land was a political journey camouflaged as a religious act; his
real purpose was to consolidate and extend German influence in the area.
Consequently, the Kaiser was to have talks with the sultan and, accord-
ing to the advice given him by the Grand Duke, take up Herzl' s cause
with the sultan. Elon reports that the Grand Duke said to Herzl "German
influence in Constantinople is now unlimited.
.
England has been crowded
out completely, to say nothing of the other powers ... If our Kaiser
19drops one word to the Sultan, it will certainly be heeded. "
Although Herzl accompanied the Kaiser on his trip and met with
him at both Constantinople and Jerusalem, it soon became clear that
the Kaiser was not about to push the Zionist cause over the sultan's
antipathy, much more important was obtaining the concession for the
Baghdad railroad and further penetrating the middle east region to the
20
detriment of the plans of his systemic rivals, particularly England.
•J 7

In 1901, Herzl approached Abdul Hamid, Sultan of the Ottoman
Empire, directly, in search of a charter for his Jewish state. Herzl
proposed that he and his rich Jewish supporters would bail the Ottomans
out of the onerous burden of debt which constricted the Empire, in return
21
for Abdul Hamid' s support. After over a year of negotiations, the
Ottomans failed to proceed with the venture and concluded a deal with
22
the so-called Rouvier group for the consolidation of the debt.
While Germany may have had neither the inclincation nor the capa-
bility to carry off a political scheme in Palestine, the same was not to be
23
the case with Great Britain. The outbreak of a new wave of Jewish
pogrom-, in Russia at the turn of the century brought with it a multitude
of refugees to England. These poor Russian and Romanian Jews were
looked upon as a threat to the British standard of living. For some time
laws had been proposed to block their entry into England. The unrest
stemmed principally from a desire to stem the flood of cheap labor.
Yet the restrictions, if imposed, would have meant the first breach in
24England's traditional open door policy for the persecuted of the continent.
The government appointed a royal commission to investigate the matter
and Herzl was able to have himself accepted as an expert witness.
After a hearing his arguments, the commission proposed Uganda, a
British territory without white settlers, as a suitable location for the
Jewish homeland. At the Sixth Zionist Congress of 1903, Herzl accepted
and endorsed the proposal of the British government for Jewish coloniza-
25
tion of Uganda. The Uganda issue split the Zionist movement, temporarily.

In the meantime, several thousand Jews from eastern Europe had
somehow made their way into Palestine and had begun competing with
26
the indiginous Arab population for land and labor. This is not to say-
that there was no attempt at compromise and accommodation between
the Jews of the second Alliyah and the Palestinian Arabs, since it
became clear to the Palestinians that they had to choose between two
courses of action. They could either attempt to reach an accommodation
with the Zionists, who in return for certain concessions, would place
clearly defined limits on their territorial and immigration ambitions,
or they would be obliged to fight the Zionists tooth and nail. In 1914,
Rashid Rida, one of the foremost Muslim leaders of the time, stated
the choice facing the Palestinian Arabs in these words:
"It is incumbent upon the leaders of the Arabs -
the local population - to do one of two things.
Either they must reach an argument with
leaders of the Zionists to settle the differences
between the interests of both parties ... or they
must gather all their forces to oppose the Zionists
in every way, first by forming societies and com-
panies, and finally by forming arnaed gangs which
oppose them by force. Some say this is the first
thing to be done because cauterization is the only
way - and caulerization is the only remedy, as
it's said ..."
This concern on the part of the Arabs over the increasing rate of
Jewish migration, and their uncertainty as to what, in fact, were the
Jews' ultimate goals, led to the call from the Arabs for a meeting to be
held in Brumanna, Lebanon, with Zionist leaders. The agenda read,
in part: "The Zionists should explain, as far as possible by producing
35

documentary evidence, the aims and methods of Zionism, and of the
colonization of Palestine connected therewith. " This meeting, however,
was never held; the First World War had broken out.
While the war in 1914 ended all hope that settlement in Africa could
be effected, it opened entirely new possibilities with regard to Palestine.
Consequently, the split within the Zionist miovement was healed and the
movement regained a united leadership. With the Ottoman Emipire opposed
by the Allied powers, Zionist association with the expected victors offered
29
the most realistic avenue to the acquisition of Palestine.
WARTIME POLITICAL MANEUVERING
Towards the end of the War, Palestine emerged on the scene of
global politics when the British army seized it from the Ottoman Turks.
Its significance lay not simply in its geographic location, but in the fact
that it was part of the process of dissolution of a once essential inter-
national actor. Since Turkey aligned herself on the side of Germany,
Britain could no longer support the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
Consequently, Britain's next best option was to obtain a major part of
the Ottoman Empire for herself. In addition, France also advanced
30
claims for a significant portion of the Empire. While these traditional
systemic actors were maneuvering for position in the Middle East, what
was to become one of the two major contemporary systemic actors in
the Middle East arena, began to assert itself. Russia saw the opportunity
to obtain control of the Bosphorous Straits and the Dardanelles, as well
31
as the feasibility of making territorial gains in Anatalia.
36

The Arabs, for their part, dreamed not only of liberation from four
centuries of Turkish rule, but of real independence from foreign influence.
The Zionists saw the end of the war and the shifting distribution of global
political and military power as their opportunity to realize their dream of
re-establishing a home for the Jewish nation in the historic land of
Palestine. The goals and aspirations of these two peoples had little in-
fluence upon the diplomatic maneuvering which occurred during this period.
The two major western powers, Britain and France, secretly concluded
with Russia the Sykes-Picot Agreement on 9 May I9I6. This agreement
provided for the division of the Ot:oman Empire into seven parts - Turkey;
one part each to be under the rule of Russian, British, and French "admin-
istration, " in addition, there were to be two "zones of influence" appor-
tioned between the French and the British. Finally, there was an inter-
nationally administered area which extended through the land of Palestine,
32from Jerusalem to the coast. Ironically, the most backward parts of
the Arab world - what is now Saudi Arabia and Yemen - were to be per-
mitted independent statehood, while the more advanced and mature were
to come under "direct or indirect" foreign rule.
During the war, the British had made promises to both Jews and
Arabs in order to get their assistance in defeating the Turks. To this
end, the British Government allowed some Arab leaders, notably Emir
Hussayn of Mecca, to believe that if they aided the British in the over-




independence would be fulfilled. To the Jews, on the other hand, the
British had also given a promise - that of a homeland in Palestine that
34
was to be redeemed from the Turks.
An agreement between Britain and Ibn Saud, ruler of the Nejd,
resulted in the latter's passive assistance, but the principal Arab -
British agreement was made with Emir Hussayn of Mecca, a powerful
influence in the Arab world. This was the Hussayn - McMahon corres-
pondence, a series of letters containing the pledge of the British govern-
ment to support the independence of the Arabs. By the terms used, the
35
ultimate status of Palestine remained vague.
THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
The Balfour Declaration, along with the previously discussed Sykes-
Picot Agreement, was one of the two key documents that have shaped
36
the modern history of the Middle East. This declaration came about
as a result of the Sykes-Picot agreement, but, it is far more important.
The letter was sent from Arthur Balfour, the British Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs to Lord Rothschild on 2 November 1917. This
declaration, while not the first, is, perhaps the most obvious example
of the unilateral relationship which prevailed between the traditional
European systemic actors of the time and the emerging regional pro-




I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on
behalf of His Majesty's Government, the follow-
ing declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist
aspirations which has been submitted to and
approved by the Cabinet:
'His Majesty's Government view with favor the
establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people, and will use their best
endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this
object, it being clearly understood that nothing
shall be done which may prejudice the civil and
religious rights of the existing non- Jewish com-
munities in Palestine, or the rights and political
status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. '
I shall be grateful if you would bring this declara-
tion to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.
Yours Sincerely,
Arthur Balfour. "
There has been much speculation as to why Balfour issued this
declaration of support when and how he did. Although he is remembered
as an early benefactor by many modern Zionists, it should be remembered
that it was hardly love for the Jews which inspired this charity far from
home. In the latter portions of the 19th century, as mentioned above,
Britain had been flooded with Eastern European Jewish refugees. There
were riots and demonstrations against them in the streets of London.
In addition, an Aliens Act was passed which limited Jewish immigration.
Lord Balfour himself defended the act, declaring.
39

"A state of things could easily be imagined in
which it would not be to the advantage of the
civilization of the country that there should be
an immense body of persons, who however
patriotic, able and industrious, however much
they threw themselves into the national life,
still, by their own action, remained a people
apart, and not merely held a religion differing
from the vast majority of their fellow countrymen,
but only inter-married among themselves. "
In addition to providing a convenient location to which to relegate the
massive influx of Jews to Great Britain, the declaration had 2 other major
goals. First there was a strategic concept, held by some British states-
men that if the Jews were restored to statehood in Palestine, they would
be an ideal people to guard the British bastion of defense on the Pales-
tinian land - bridge between the Nile and the Near East. Secondly, there
was an important propoganda profit to be gained. In the difficult days of
I9I6, 1917, if the British could get the moral support of Jews, especially
in America, then this support might provide a means of winning America
over to the cause of the allied nations, thereby producing an obvious
ancillary advantage.
At the time of its promulgation, many Arab leaders looked upon this
Declaration with favor. The weak and inexperienced Arab National Move-
ment looked to the Zionists for sympathy and assistance. The Mufti of
39Jerusalem appeared openly friendly, and when Hussayn was informed
of the Balfour Declaration, he responded with "... an expression of good
40
will towards a kindred Semitic race. " Later, on 1 January 1919,
Weizmann and Hussayn's son, Feisal, representing the Arab cause.
40

signed a "Treaty of Friendship" agreement providing for Jewish settle-
ment in Palestine. Interestingly, Feisal made a remarkable statement
at that time, especially in view of the emerging nationalism of Jews and
Arabs. "The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood and there is no
conflict of character between the two races. In principles, we are ab-
41
solutely as one. " Further, in March of that year, Feisal, again acting
officially, this time as leader of the Hejazi delegation to Paris, stated,
in a letter to Justice Felix Frankfurter, "We Arabs look with the deepest
sympathy on the Zionist movement . . . We will wish the Jews a most
hearty welcome home. "
DEVELOPING PATTERNS OF MUTUAL EXPLOITATION
A later section of this paper will deal with the present day subsys-
temic dominance of the relationship of the Middle East to the International
system. Even at this early stage in the internationalization of the Palestine
problem, conflicting interests and plans for mutual exploitation may be
seen emerging;
"We therefore, say that while the creation of a
Jewish commonwealth in Palestine is our final
ideal
. . . the way to achieve it lies through a
series of intermediary stages. And one of those
intermediary stages, which I hope is going to
come about as the result of the war, is that the
fair country of Palestine will be protected by
such a mighty and just power as Great Britain.
Under the wing of this power, Jews will be able
to develop and to set up the administrative
machinery which . . . would enable us to carry
43
out the Zionist scheme. "
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The above is an excerpt from a speech delivered by Weizmann to the
English Zionist Union in 1917, and demonstrates that although the manip-
ulation of the traditional nineteenth century colonial powers may have
played a large role in creating a situation within the region which made
conflict inevitable, still the prospective participants within the region
were loathe to see these extra regional powers leave the area and then
to their own devices. This paper will attempt to demonstrate that the
United States and the Soviet Union as the major bloc actors in the con-
temporary international system are being asked by the regional actors
for much the same sort of protection as Weizmann described.
That the interest in great power of participation in the area was
reciprocal is evidenced by this memorandum of Lord Balfour to the
British cabinet;
"Do we mean, in the case of Syria, to consult
principally the wishes of the inhabitants? We
mean nothing of the kind . . . The contradiction
between the letter of the Covenant"^ and the policy
of the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of
the "independent nation" of Palestine than in that
of the "independent nation" of Syria. For in
Palestine we do not propose even to go through
the form of consulting the wishes of the present
inhabitant of the country . . . The Four Great
Powers are committed to Zionism, and Zionism
be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in
age long traditions, in present needs, in future
hopes, of far profounder import than the desires
and prejudice of the 700, 000 Arabs who now inhabit
that ancient land ... In short, so far as Palestine
is concerned, the Powers have made no statement
of fact which is not admittedly wrong, and no
declaration of policy, which, at least in the letter,
they have not always intended to violage. "
* Covenant of the League of Nations
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Thus, it can be seen that the problem of mutual non-recognition
described in the preceding chapter applied not only to the regional pro-
tagonists but to the systemic actors as well. How else to explain the
statement that "Zionismi ... is ... of far profounder import than the
desires and prejudices of the 700, 000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient
land. "
At war's end, the British were faced with the resolution of their
conflicting promises and agreements. The peace settlement for the
Arab areas came with the San Remo Conference of April 1920 - however,
this agreement was unable to foster true peace in the area. Since the
Allied pledges regarding Arab independence were not fulfilled after the
war, most Arab leaders regarded the Feisal-Weizmann agreement as
invalid. The Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine had begun, and was
destined to continue, at varying levels of intensity, until now.
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MANDATE
If the Zionists did not obtain their desire for the early creation of
Herzl's "Judenstaat, " they were not entirely frustrated either. Palestine
was mandated to Britain by the League of Nations, with the provisions
of the Balfour Declaration written into the Mandate. In accordance with
the Sykes-Picot agreement, the predominately Arab area of the toppled
Turkish Empire was duly divided between France and Britain, and the
Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers at San Remo on
4625 April 1920 assigned the Palestine Mandate to Great Britain. This
was a class "A" mandate, which, as outlined in the Covenant, meant

that the tutelage of Britain was to be temporary, and was to lead to
47
ultimate independence of Palestine. The principle of self-determination
espoused by Wilson was thus rejected. There were no American delegates
present at the Conference, however, the American Ambassador to Italy,
Robert Underwood Johnson, did come to San Remo. It appears that he
was not properly briefed on the issues and did not receive full instructions
48from Washington. Lenczowski quotes moreover thus, "For two days
the representative of the United States sat in a hotel garden reading the
newspapers while the British and French settled the most important
49
matters affecting the Middle East.
The "Principle Allied Powers" had, therefore, not only selected
Great Britain as the Mandatory for Palestine, but had also in Articles 2
and 6 of the Mandate, repeated the language of the Balfour Declaration
in outlining the responsibilities of the new Mandatory - to place Palestine
"under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as would
50
secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home. " The terms
of the mandate received the approval of the Council of the League of
Nations on 24 July 1922, although it was not formalized until an agree-
ment was reached between Great Britain and the League of Nations on
51
23 September, 1922.
The decisions of the San Remo Conference and the resultant Mandate
were not carried out without considerable bloodshed. There was an
uprising by Muslims and Christian Arabs in Palestine, armed against
the Jews, who were already demanding that Palestine should be called
44

Eretz Israel with the Jewish flag as its national emblem. Although the
Palestinian Arabs had not been enthusiastic supporters of the Arab Revolt,
52
they were now united in their fear and dislike of Zionism.
It is evident, therefore, that the question of Palestine had become
internationalized, and incorporated in the new world order envisioned by
the League of Nations. This vision included the implementation of the
Balfour Declaration. (Although the United States did not join the League,
it supported the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine by a joint
53
resolution of Congress in 1922.) The powers responsible for the crea-
tion of the mandate, and the appropriation of influence within the Middle
East subsystem were much more precise in delimiting each other's
sphere of influence within the subsystem than they were in dealing with
the primordial affinities and rivalries in the area; further the desires of
the emerging political movement within the subsystem, with the exception
of Zionism, which was closely coupled with the political subsystem of the
essential national actors, were hardly considered at all.
Important changes in the international system precipitated by the
increasing rigidity of the system of alignment, since approximately 1870,
and the subsequent violation of the rule that "defeated or constrained
essential national actors . . . re-enter the system as acceptable role
partners ..." were an important factor in the outbreak of the First
54World War. Thus, there was a greater need for integrating roles
other than the "balancing" role specified in Kaplan's essential rules of
45

the "Balance of power" system. To meet this need the Hague Tribunal
and the League of Nations implemented a new integrative role more
consistent with the loose bipolar system, signaling a dangerous instability
55
in the "balance of power" system.
Although Kaplan's view is that the peace settlements after the First
World War were not completely inconsistent with the essential rules of
the system, they may have encouraged those national tendencies that
were to become inconsistent with them. "When the international and
national sets of essential rules were no longer in equilibrium, one set
had to give. "
The disintegrative process of the "balance of power" international
system had begun. The transformance of the international system was
not abrupt, however, and one cannot claim that the transformation into
a bipolar bloc system was complete until after the Second World War.
The next chapter will deal with a challenge to the regulatory orientation
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IV. SUB-SYSTEMIC CHALLENGES TO A DISINTEGRATING
"BALANCE OF POWER" SYSTEM
1
Safran delineates certain relatively well defined phases through
which the Arab-Israeli conflict has evolved. The first stage, which was
described in the preceding chapter, lasted until approximately 1933.
During that time, Britain, as Mandatory power in Palestine, wielded
great influence in the Arab world and had nearly full discretion to decide
the Palestine issue on its own merits, as it conceived them, and in keep-
ing with its broader national interests. Safran's second phase begins a
few years later, when the growing strength of Arab and Jewish national-
isms imposed severe restrictions on Britain's discretionary power and
transformed the process from one of adjudication into an issue of political
management of conflicting interests. The division of phases of the con-
flict fits well with the supposition of the paper that as the "balance of
power" international system continued the deterioration begun by the
First World War, the subsystemic actors began to challenge the sys-
temic dominance of the essential national actors.
At this point, the author feels it important to restate the difference
between his use of the terms system or subsystem dominance and that
used by Kaplan. For Kaplan:
"The 'balance of power' international system is a
subsystem dominant system in which the comple-
mentary actions of several of the essential sub-





These essential subsystems are the great national powers. As used in
this paper, however, the terms system dominance or subsystem dom-
inance refer to the coercive relationships between the essential sub-
systeins (systemic actors) and the non-essential subsystems (subsysteinic
or regional actors). To the extent that the behavior of the regional actors
is determined by either direct channels of communication from the sys-
temic actors to them, or by the systems of interaction between the sys-
temic actors, then the system is systemically dominated. Britain's
relationship with the subsystemic actors within its mandated territory
was virtually totally system dominant during the first years of the man-
date and, thus, this system of relationships approximated a political
subsystem, with Britain acting as "arbiter . . . available to keep jurisdic-
3
tional disputes within . . . given bounds. " This chapter will deal with
the dissolution of that international quasi-political subsystem as the
regional actors develop their growing nationalisms.
THE ARAB REBELLION
By 1935, thelegal-not to mention illegal- Jewish immigration to
Palestine had reached the record figure of 61, 844 per year. Land sales
were increasing: in 1933 there had been 673 of them, in 1934, 1, 178.
More and more peasants were losing their livelihood; yet, as early as
1931, it had been estimated that 30, 000 peasant families, or 22 per cent
4
of the, rural population were landless. Their average per capita income
was seven pounds per year, compared to 34 pounds for the Jewish
farmers who replaced them. And the peasant family's average
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indebtedness - 25 to 30 pounds - was about the same as its average
5
earnings.
It was in this fertile soil that the seeds of the Arab rebellion took
root. On 12 November, 1935, Shaikh Izzedin Qassem presided over a
secret meeting in the slum quarter of Haifa. Qassem had been a "mar-
riage steward" for the Haifa Muslim court, consequently he was able to
move easily among the inhabitants of the countryside. He knew both
peasants and workers and continually preached about the dangers of
Zionism. Over the years, he had gathered a band of about 800 followers.
They pledged to give their lives for Palestine; they supplied their own
arms and contributed what else they could to the cause. Their training
was to be done by stealth, at night.
After the meeting at Haifa, Qassem and a group of his closest fol-
lowers made their way to the hills of Janin. They spent their days in
caves, praying and reciting the Quaran. At night they attacked Jews and
the British. Shortly after they began their raids, however, the authorities
sent out a mixed force of British and Arab troops to track them down.
Qassem and his followers were forced to premature battle. Called upon
to surrender, he shouted, "Never, this is a jihad for God and country. "
He called upon his followers to "die as martyrs. " After a battle lasting




This brief and militarily futile rebellion stirred up the Palestinian
masses. Qassem became for them a symbol and a rallying point.
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somewhat as Joseph Trumpeldor had been for the Jews in 1920. He was
the archetypal fedayi - "one who sacrifices himself" - and was the pre-
cursor of the contemporary Palestinian movement.
By 1936, serious confrontations between Arab and Jew were becom-
ing common. The British forces were being increasingly pressured by
both sides. The rapid Jewish immigration continued and contributed to
an Arab demand for immediate self-government and a cessation of im-
migration. By the end of April, a general Arab strike spread through-
out the land and precipitated violence between Arabs and Jews as well
8
as against the British presence. The Mufti, who had called for the
strike, was as severe with Arabs who were selling lands, and in other
ways accommodating Jewish immigration, as he was with the Jews
themselves. The British, too, were objects of the Arab revolt: Britons




In May, Britain sought to quell these disturbances by sending Earl
Peel as head of yet another commission of inquiry. But an impasse
developed: The Peel Commission would not leave England until the
Arab's general strike ended, but the Arab High Committee would not end
the strike until Jewish immigration was suspended, and the British re-
fused to cancel the immigration schedules. Palestine had grown import-
ant to the British Empire because of the air routes to Asia and Africa,
sea lanes through Suez and the Mediterranean, and oil deliveries from
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Iraq, The government claimed that the security of these interests were
dependent upon the success of Zionism in Palestine. British difficulties
and embarrassment mounted. Sentiment and pronouncements in Turkey,
Iraq, Egypt and India sided with the Arabs, while Poland and the United
10
States pressed England to favor the Zionists.
In October, the Arab Higher Committee agreed to call off the strike,
without a concurrent suspension of immigration, largely due to the pleas
of the Kings of Iraq and Saudi Arabia - both of whom were under consid-
erable British pressure - and the Peel Commission arrived in Noveraber.
The reader should note that the British were still able as an extra regional
actor to influence a regional actor or to exert intra-regional pressure to
achieve the goals of the extra regional actor.
The Commission published its report in July, 1937, and stated that
the desire of the Arabs for national independence and their hatred and fear
of the Jewish National Home were the underlying causes of the disturbances,
It stated that Arab and Jewish interests could not be reconciled under the
Mandate and suggested the partition of Palestine. Both Arabs and Jews
attacked the report, thus making its implementation at that time impossible.
In November, 1938, Britain rejected the recommendations of the Peel
Commission, because the commission was unable to recommend "bound-
aries for the proposed areas which will afford a reasonable prospect of the
12
eventual establishment of self-supporting Arab and Jewish States. "
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PROTOTYPE OF CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EASTERN NEGOTIATIONS
The British position paper of 1938, went on to state:
"... It is clear that the surest foundation for
peace and progress in Palestine would be an
understanding between the Arabs and the Jews,
and His Majesty's Government are prepared in
the first instance to make a determined effort to
promote such an understanding. With this end in
view, they propose immediately to invite repre-
sentatives of the Palestinian Arabs and of the
neighboring States on the one hand, and of the
Jewish Agency on the other, to confer with them
as soon as possible in London regarding future
policy, including the question of immigration to
Palestine. As regards the representation of the
Palestinian Arabs, His Majesty's Government must
reserve the right to refuse to receive those leaders
whom they regard as responsible for the campaign
of assassination and violence. "'••^
Note the similarity between this call for discussions and the present
efforts of the major extra-regional powers to get the opposing regional
factions to meet together with them at Geneva. Note, too, the reser-
vation expressed concerning the representation of the Palestinian Arabs,
a reservation similar to the modern Israeli rejection of direct negotia-
tions with the Palestine Liberation Organization.
The meeting eventually took place and lasted a month. It was
marked by reciprocal obstructionism and demonstrated the immensity
of difference of opinion between the two sides. Representatives of the
Arab states did meet with Weizmann, but the Palestinians did not.
Whereas, in 1914, the opposing sides would have been ready, had
global war not prevented it, to meet with the enemy over the negotiating

table, the intervening 25 years had seen the dimensions of the struggle
grow to such proportions that to have done so now would have conferred
a legitimacy on the whole Zionist enterprise almost as unthinkable as
14
"recognizing" Israel was to be for the generation to come.
In a prefigurement of "indirect negotiations, " of "proximity talks, "
of jet-age "shuttle-diplomacy" - and all the other procedural ingenuities
that peace makers of the future would devise, the conference took the
form of separate discussions between the British, the Arabs, then the
British and the Jews. When the inevitable impasse was reached, Britain
issued a unilateral position paper, known as the MacDonald White Paper
of 17 May 1939 (so-called after Malcolin. MacDonald, the Colonial
Secretary). The paper declared that since the earlier partition plan
had been found to be impractical, a new method of solving the Palestine
problem, consistent with Britain's obligations to both Arabs and Jews,
would be attempted. The Balfour Declaration, the document stated,
had not envisaged the conversion of all of Palestine into a Jewish State,
but merely the establishment in that country of a "Jewish National Home, "
which meant the development of the existing Jewish community into a
center for Jewish people. Since the Jewish population of Palestine had
increased to about 450, 000, approaching one third of the population,
the government considered that it had carried out its obligation in this
15
respect. Consequently the government announced that 75, 000 Jewish
immigrants would be admitted over the next five years, but that no
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more would be admitted after that without the prior approval of the
Arabs; that land sales should be strictly regulated; and that self govern-
ing institutions should be established with a view to the independence
of the Palestinian state within ten years.
REGIONAL REACTION
The Arab Higher Coramittee rejected this solution, and demanded
independence rather than a ten year delay. Fisher attributes this re-
jection by the Arabs to their fear -based upon how quickly previous
statements favorable to the Arab cause (the Churchill and Passfield
documents, for example) were disowned by the British government, that
Jewish pressure upon the government could substantially alter, if not
nullify the projected outcome. Nonetheless, a substantial portion of
Palestinian Arabs felt that they were at last receiving fair treatment
and supported the White Paper.
The Zionist responded instantly and violently. In Palestine, the
broadcasting station which was to proclaim the recommendations of the
White paper, could not do so at the appointed hour because its studios
were bombed and its transmission lines cut. The headquarters of the
Department of Migration was set afire and government offices in Haifa
and Tel Aviv were stormed by crowds intent on destroying any files
17
pertaining to illegal Jewish immigration. David Ben Gurion wrote
that these demonstrations marked "the beginning of Jewish resistance
to the disastrous policy now proposed by His Majesty's Government.
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The Jews will not be intimidated into surrender, even if their blood
18
will be shed. "
MOBILIZATION OF ZIONIST FORCES
In his book, Israel Without Zionists , Uri Avnery discusses the
disputes between "practical" Zionism, as espoused by Ben Gurion and
supported by Weizmann, and "political" Zionism, as advocated by
Jabatinsky and the right wing faction. Avnery goes on to coin a new
term to describe the accomplishments of Jabatinsky and his followers:
19
"Gun Zionism" The ideological roots of "Gun Zionism" extend to
Herzl himself. It was inevitable, he said, that arraed force would
eventually come into its own as the principal instrument of a moveraent
which in its earlier and less defined period, could only rely upon the
protection of an imperial sponsor. The period of dependency upon an
extra-regional sponsor was rapidly drawing to a close. The spirit of
Jabatinsky, who founded the Jewish Legion during World War I and
' 20
later led the underground Haganah army, was permeating the Yishuy .
When the Arab rebellion manifested itself with acts of violence, the
Jews officially espoused a program of Havlaga or self-restraint. This
concept was deeply rooted in Jewish ethics. The Jews felt that they
should not respond to Arab terrorism with their own. It was felt that
the Jewish claim to moral superiority was worth more than any transi-
tory success over Arab terorists which entailed a resort to similar
modes of operation. Weizmann himself described the principle of
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act which had won the admiration of liberal opinion all over the world.
Havlaga was a concept doomed to extinction. In one month, July,
1938 at least 100 Arabs died in Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem - more
22Arabs dead than Jews killed in the whole of that year so far.
23
Schechtman states that Jabatinsky was not certain as to the morality
of terrorism. He once said: "I can't see much heroism and public
good in shooting from the rear an Arab peasant on a donkey, carrying
23
vegetables for sale in Tel Aviv. " Eventually, however, he came to
accept and advocate a policy of wholesale retaliation. Moreover, he
early recognized the difficulties involved in limiting retaliation to only
the "bandits" involved in violent acts against the Jewish populace. He
said: " . . the choice is not between retaliating against the bandits or
against the hostile population. The choice is between . . . retaliating
against the hostile population or not retaliating at all .... . To the
spilling of ha 'dam hamutar the permitted blood, on which there is no
prohibition and for which nobody has to pay, an end has been put in
Palestine ... it was not only difficult to punish only the guilty ones, in
24
most cases it was impossible. "
Although the Jews responded effectively and with perhaps a vengeance
to Arab attacks upon them, it was by publically espousing a policy of
Havlaga that they were able to make their most important political/
military power, demoralizing the population, and constraining such
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leadership as was evident, allowed the Jewish leaders to mold the
Yishuv into a formidable fighting force.
"Havlaga, however genuine in some, was purely
expedient in others. It was designed to win
British support for the establishment of a Jewish
militia. "25
In 1936, the Mandatory administration authorized the formation of
a 1, 240 man Jewish supernumerary police. That same year, it informed
the Zionist leaders that a special force of constables would be permitted
to remain in being, with their weapons, provided that Haganah was dis-
banded and its illegal weapons confiscated. Eventually, as Arab violence
grew, the confiscation was dropped, and in the following two years the
force was expanded until, by 1939, it totalled 14, 500 men, or approxi-
raately 5 per cent of the Yishuv.
In 1939, after the MacDonald White Paper, the Jewish community
prepared to fight against the Mandate. British rules, no longer nurtured
the Zionist cause, but held it back. The new era of "organized revolu-
tionary rule" by the Jewish minority had arrived. The Jews recognized
the need to get rid of the mandate and continue their nation building
program. The systemic cataclysm of the Second World War, however,
would slow down the rapidly advancing movement to do away with the
Mandate. With the outbreak of the war the Yishuv rallied to the support
of the Allied Powers and anti-British violence virtually came to an end.
As Weizmann predicted this war furnished opportunities for the Zionist
movement and its aim of an independent Jewish State in Palestine as
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great as had been provided by the First World War. The war gave the
idea of a Jev^ish state a final and decisive push. The tragedy that befell
European Jews, called in Hebrew Hashoah, or the Holocaust, completely
28
changed the psychological and political scene. Zionism's "center of
29
gravity" was transitioning from the Diaspora to the Yishuv . "
WORLD WAR II
It is impossible to assess the full impact that a systemic upheaval
of the magnitude of the Second World War had upon the unfolding con-
flict in the Middle East. As was mentioned above, the 1939 White Paper
was met with at least partial rejection by the Arabs and outrage by the
Jews. Just how far Britain was prepared to go to insure its implementa-
tion, and to what lengths the regional powers would attempt to frustrate
it will never be known for the cataclysm of Global war intervened.
The Jews' efforts to obtain sanctuary for their millions in Central
Europe had been dismally barren; only the tiny Dominican Republic had
displayed any truly humanitarian concern for their plight by offering to
30
accept 100, 000 refugees, a huge sum in proportion to her size.
Britain, courting Arab assistance, refused to abrogate the 1939 White
Paper. The official Zionist attitude was again expressed by Ben Gurion
when he said, "We shall fight with Great Britain in this war as if there
was no White Paper, and we shall fight the White Paper as if there was
32
no war, " This the Jews did - as much as was permitted them. Their




Forces was repeatedly refused until nearly the end of the war. The
Yishuv, nonetheless, achieved an extremely high production rate for
war materials and the Mossad (Committee for Illegal Immigration)
was forced to terminate its European activities by which thousands of
immigrants had been smuggled to Palestine, and to concentrate on other
33
areas until the war was over.
Palestine itself was relatively quiet during the war, although to
anyone not totally concerned with the war against Germany, the coming
eruption was easy to predict. The Arab rebellion died down and Jewish
immigration nearly stopped due to the inability of Jews to escape Nazi
occupied Europe. Although the Zionists cooperated strongly with Britain
at the early stages of the war, the failure, due primarily to British
military opposition of the Zionists to form a Jewish Army to fight
Nazism, turned the Zionists increasingly against Britain as the war
progressed. A series of attacks by two extremist groups, the Stern
Gang and the Irgun, culminated in the assassination of Lord Moyne, the
British Minister of State in Cairo. The military capabilities of the
Palestinian Jews greatly improved during the war. Apart from the
27,000 Jews who received training in the British forces, the Jewish
munitions industry developed rapidly and the unofficial Zionist forces
34
ended the war with an ample stockpile of light arms.
The Arabs, also, were not totally inactive. Their assistance to
the Allies was raeager at first, but increased as the war continued and
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it appeared that the Allies would win. In Egypt, for example, diplomatic
relations were broken with Germany when World War II began, and with
Italy when Italy entered the war in the summer of 1940. Yet war was
not declared. The country became a main staging area for the British
Eight Army as the western desert became a major theater of operations,
and in the exigencies of the situation, such freedom of action as was
possessed by Egypt was quickly subordinated to the demands of the
British military. Egyptian reticence or sympathy for the Axis, widely
shared in the Arab world, was overcome by a coup de main in which the
British forces surrounded the palace of King Farouk in February 1941
and threatened to depose the king unless he named a prime minister of
their choosing.
It may be said that the end of World War II marked a real beginning
of independence and self-assertion in the Arab countries. With the
departure of the Allied Forces and the formal nationalization of the
military forces which had been created in the mandate states, National
government had more real power, but also accepted more responsibility
than ever before.
During the war, international Zionism shifted its main effort from
Britain to the United States, where it was supported by both Major
political parties. This shift was of great significance, because, hence-
r; forth, United States concern with Palestine was to be the principal
factor shaping its Middle East policies. A related and equally important
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development was the challenge mounted against Weizmann by Ben Gurion
against the former's unquestionable leadership of World Zionism. Al-
though Weizmann reraained the symbol of the World Zionist Movement,
it was Ben Gurion who assumed a position of unquestioned leadership
in Palestine. With his accession to power in the words of Peter
Mansfield, ". . . the last remote hope of a peaceful outcome in Palestine
36
disappeared. "
THE DEVOLUTION OF BRITISH POWER IN PALESTINE
Two weeks after the end of the war, the Zionists demanded from
Churchill's coalition government that Palestine be proclaimed "un-
diminished and undivided, " as a Jewish state. The government deferred
any such proclamation until a general peace conference was convened.
Shortly thereafter, Churchill's government was defeated at the polls
and the Labor Party assumed power. The new government also refused
to act on the demands, and called, instead for yet another Comraission
of Inquiry to Palestine.
Zionist activism aimed at the imminent establishment of the Jewish
state turned towards acts of violence. Perhaps the high point of their
campaign against the British occurred in July, 1946 with the attack on
the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, an attack in which 88 people, Britons,
37
Arabs and Jews were killed. The response in Britain to this and
» other acts of violence against British presence in Palestine took two
forms; the first response was anger, an anger which became generalized

to include even Jews living in England who were viewed as supporters
of the terrorist groups which attacked British military forces. There
were anti-Jewish protests which occasionally became violent, and
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several instances of the desecration of synogogues. The second
response was a call for Britain to extricate itself from the quagmire
that its mandate had become. Churchill, speaking in the House of
Comraons, urged that Britain "... lay our Mandate at the feet of the
United Nations Organization and thereafter evacuate the country with
which we have no connection or tradition and where we have no sovereignty
39
as in India and no treaty as in Egypt ..." These sentiments were
echoed by Field Marshall Montgomery, who concluded, "if we were not
prepared to maintain law and order in Palestine it would be better to
,,40
get out. "
Palestine had become an insufferable problem for Britain. Its inter-
nationalization by the Great Powers, through the machinery of the League
of Nations and the specific instrument of the British Mandate had only
exacerbated the incipient conflict between two peoples with clairas to the
same land. Having repeatedly failed to find a satisfactory solution to
the Palestine dilemma, and facing mounting domestic opposition to its
foreign policy, Britain laid the problem before the successor of the
League of Nations, the fledgling United Nations Organization.
THE UNITED NATIONS AND PROBLEM OF PALESTINE
The United Nations was born of the war, and was a manifestation
of the changes taking place in the international system. Kaplan credits

informational inputs concerning the increased destructiveness of war,
and the failure of international actors to internalize the norms of the
system and to limit their goals of expansion as major factors leading to
41
the establishment of universal actors, such as the United Nations.
One of the first major challenges to the fledgling organization was the
problem of Palestine, a problem which the British had despaired of
solving unilaterally.
On 2 April 1947, the British representative at the United Nations,
Sir Alexander Cadogan requested that the issue of Palestine be addressed
at that year's session of the General Assembly. On 29 November, the
Assembly, by two-thirds vote adopted a resolution on the "Plan of
Partition with Economic Union of Palestine. " The vote on the resolu-
tion was thirty-three in the affirmative, thirteen in the negative with
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ten abstentions. The major provisions of the plan are as follows:
(1) The Mandate was terminated
(2) The Arab State, the Jewish State, and the international
regime for Jerusalem were to come into being two months
after the departure of the British troops, which was
scheduled for 1 August 1948.
(3) The boundaries of the three territories were defined.
(4) Economic union was to be achieved through a Joint
Economic Board
(5) A United Nations Palestine Commission of five member




(6) The Security Council was called upon to assist in the
implementation of the plan.
(7) No discrimination was to be made between the inhabitants
on the basis of race, religion, language, or sex.
The "solution" therefore, was a partition similar to that proposed by
the Royal Coramission in 1937: a partition into a Jewish State, an Arab
State, and an internationally administered Jerusalem.
Primary responsibility for assuring the implementation of the
resolution was placed upon the Palestine Commission. The actual
implementation, however, depended upon the policies of the permanent
members of the Security Council, since enforcement of United Nations
policies was the responsibility of that organization. The commission
invited the Higher Arab Committee, Britain, as Mandatory power, and
the Jewish Agency to send representatives to "be available to the
44
commission. " Although both Britain and the Jewish Agency accepted
the invitation, the Arab Higher Committee refused and issued the fol-
45
lowing statement on 6 February 1948:
"The Arabs of Palestine will never recognize the
validity of the extorted partition recommendations
or the authority of the United Nations to make them
. . .
The Arabs of Palestine consider that any attempt by
Jews or any Power or group of Powers to establish
a Jewish state in Arab territory is an act of aggres-
sion which will be resisted in self-defense by force. "
In Palestine the situation continued to deteriorate. The extent of
the violence from the passage of the Partition Resolution until 1 February
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1948 was revealed in the casualty figures, which totalled 2, 778, of whom
869 were killed. The Arabs suffered 1,462 casualties; the Jews, 1, 106;
46
and the British, 181. On 10 April, 1948, the Palestine Commission
reported to the General Assembly that ". . . as a result of Arab armed
opposition to the resolution of the General Assembly, counter or pre-
ventive measures taken by the organized Jewish community, and the
continued activity of Jewish extremist elements, Palestine is now a
47
battlefield. " Arab-Israeli violence had increased to a point described
48by one author as "an experiment in anarchy. " The coinmission was
forced to admit that it had now become irapossible to implement the
Partition Resolution. ^
THE CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL
The British had announced that they were leaving Palestine on
15 May, 1948, but, in fact, they left the day before: at nine o'clock on
the morning of 14 May, 1948, Sir Alan Cunningham, last British High
Commissioner, left Palestine. At four o'clock that afternoon, in the
Tel Aviv Museum of Modern Art, David Ben Gurion proclaimed the
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establishment of the sovereign Jewish State, to be called Israel.
On the same day, the representatives of the Jewish Agency informed
the United Nations that a Jewish State had been proclaimed. In its
Proclamation of Independence, Israel announced that it was willing
"to cooperate with the organs and representatives of the Resolution
of the Assembly of 29 November 1947, and will take steps to bring about
6 9

the Economic Union over the whole of Palestine. ' The United States,
which had earlier proposed a temporary trusteeship over Palestine,
nevertheless granted immediate de facto recogntiion of the Provisional
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Government of the state of Israel. The Soviet Union followed suit, and
three days later became the third country to recognize Israel. In the
words of Theodore Draper, "If the existence of the State of Israel was
53
the original sin, the Soviets were as implicated in it as anyone else. "
The United Nations General Assembly, having failed to enforce its Parti-
tion Resolution, terminated the Palestine Commission and appointed a
mediator to promote the peaceful settlement of the situation in Palestine.
THE FIRST ARAB-ISRAELI WAR
On 15 May, 1948, after the Mandatory force had withdrawn from
Palestine, the Arab states attacked the newly proclaimed State of Israel.
In a telegram to the United Nations Secretary General, the Arab States
informed him that they were compelled to intervene in Palestine because
the disturbances there constituted a serious and direct threat to peace
and security within the territories of the Arab states, and "in order to
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restore peace and establish law in Palestine. "
This first Arab-Israeli dispute, is remarkable in that it exemplifies
the deep seated problera of mutual non-recognition described in an earlier








Transjordan aside, the leaders, soldiers,
politicians, writers, journalists, not to speak
of the common people of the Arab countries had
had no contact with the Jewish community in
Palestine and therefore, had but a faint idea
of its coraposition, organization, achieveraent,
guiding ideals, aspirations and strength. The
Arab government had been drawn into the dip-
lomatic arena of the Jewish-Arab conflict only
a short time before and did not expect to be-
come directly involved in it militarily. In any
case, they were so certain of their superior
strength that they did not think it worthwhile to
asserr^ble more than perfunctory intelligence at
the very last moment before the opening of hostili-
ties. The Arabs' almost total lack of non-bel-
ligerent contact with the enemy's people and
country, and the Israelis' only slightly less
sweeping lack of control with the Arab states,
was to continue after the war and to.pro vide
what is probably a unique example of nations
at war that had never known one another in
peaceful commerce. This mutual ignorance
accounts for much of the extreme fluctuation in
the sensitivities and mutual assessments of in-
tentions that has been characteristic of the
parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. "
The considerable disruption of mandated Palestine which the
Palestinian Arabs were able to inflict despite their primitive equipment,
lack of training, and loose organization had convinced the Arab govern-
ments that a small regular force could succeed in destroying Israel.
There was also a question of Arab intentions. Of course the Arab states
would, if presented with the option, have destroyed the new Jewish state.
Indeed, there were numerous public statements to the effect that they
would do so. Musa Alarai, a distinguished Palestinian leader visited
the Arab capitals shortly before the Israeli Declaration of Independence

inorder to assess just what sort of help the Palestinians could expect
from their Arab brethren. He discovered that the Arab leadership was
no better equipped to cope with the growing "Zionist peril, " than the
56
Palestinian leadership had been when it was alone in the field. One
author gives this account of the responses he received:
"I am happy to tell you, " the Syrian President
assured him, "that our Army and its equipment
are of the highest order and well able to deal with
a few Jews, and I can tell you in confidence that
we even have an atomic bomb;" and seeing Musa's
expression of incredulity, he went on, "yes, it
was made locally; we fortunately found a very clever
fellow, a tinsmith ..." Elsewhere he found equal
complacency, and ignorance which was little less
crass. In Iraq, he was told by the Prime Minister
that all that was needed was "a few brooms" to drive
the Jews into the sea; by confidants of Ibn Saud in
Cairo, that "once we get the green light from the
British we can easily throw out the Jews . . . . "
There appears to be a relatively prevalent raisconception amongst
casual commentators on the conflict, that the Israelis were severely
outnumbered by the Arabs. Images of 650, 000 Israelis fending off
sorae 40 million Arabs are often conjured up. In fact the military
advantage rested with the Israelis as the Arab troops were dispatched
to Palestine on 15 May, 1948. The Zionist forces had, by the beginning
of the war had far more men and women mobilized than the Arab countries,
and they maintained and increased this disparity in the course of hostili-
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ties. The May Zionist forces included sorae 30, 000 fully mobilized
regular troops, at least 32, 000 second-line troops, which could be
attached to the regulars as need arose, some 15,000 Jewish settlement
72

police, a home guard of 32, 000-plus the forces of the Irgun and Stern
Gang. The Arab Liberation Army, on the other hand, mustered 3, 830
volunteers -at least 1, 000 of them Palestinians. This group began a
gradual infiltration into Palestine in January 1948. The forces which
the five Arab states - Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Egypt and Lebanon -
dispatched numbered some 15,000 men; whose heaviest armor consisted
59
of 22 light tanks.
It is perhaps indicative of the unrealistic assessment which the Arabs
had made of the forces required to defeat the Jews and of their own mili-
tary potential, that the initial Arab plan was not to field the total of even
this modest force. Instead, they initially entrusted the intervention to
Transjordan's 6,000 strong Arab Legion alone. King Abdullah, however
whose forces had served under the Mandatory administration in Palestine,
knew better than this. He consequently overtly accepted the mandate
of his Arab League partners, while covertly arranging with the Jews that
the Arab Legion would seek to take over only those parts of Palestine
60
allocated to the Arabs by the partition plan. This plan was nullified
when Egypt, fearing that Abdullah's ambitions were to take over the
whole of Palestine, dispatched its own forces into Palestine, and
induced the other Arab government to follow suit and adopt a common
plan of action aimed at destroying Israel, or, as a fall back position,
6
1
limiting it to the narrowest confines. Azzam Pasha, Secretary
General of the Arab League promised that it would be "... a war of
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extermination and momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the
Mongolian massacre and the Crusades. " The Arabs scored some
initial successes, and the Egyptians linked up with the Arab Legion near
Bethlehem, but the Israelis, fighting desperately, launched a violent
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counter offensive which ended in an Arab collapse. After twenty-seven
days of open fighting, a cease fire was arranged by Count Eernadotte,
the UN mediator sent to restore peace to Palestine.
Fighting broke out again on 8 July, but the Arab armies were dis-
organized and had no coramon plan of action. The Israeli forces used
the ten days of renewed fighting to expand their area of occupation. As
one writer points out, the Arabs had not accepted partition, so they lost
much of the territory which would have been the Arab state in Palestine.
After the first cease fire, they did not accept Bernadotte's plan to give
64them the Negev, so they lost it.
Evidence of continuing Arab disunity may be seen in the events of
September, when during the cease fire, an "Arab Government of all
Palestine" was proclaimed. This organization was recognized by all
the Arab government except Transjordan, which organized its own
"National Congress. " This widening rift between Kings Abdullah and
Farouk, enabled the Israelis to concentrate their strength against the
Egyptian forces and increase their territory to the south. Another
cease fire was proclaimed on 22 October in the south, but on the same
day fighting broke out in Lebanon to the north. On 22 December, the
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Israelis' penetrated Egyptian territory.
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Britain announced that it would intervene in accordance with its
treaty of 1936 with Egypt unless Israel withdrew her forces from. Egyptian
territory and stability was regained in Egypt. The Egyptian government,
seeking to avoid a return of British forces to its soil notified the United
Nations that it was prepared to discuss peace. The resulting armistice
was signed in February 1949 by Israel and Egypt, and later by all other
parties except Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen. Open war was terminated,
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but true peace was still a distant and not very promising prospect.
THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The end of the Second World War brought with it the emergence of
a new type of international system. The traditional systemic actors in
the "balance of power" system gave way to two powerful blocs, the
leaders of which were the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively.
The de facto existence of these blocs was given de jure recognition with
the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 by the
western powers, and with the establishment of the Warsaw Treaty
Organization in 1955 by the Soviet leadership.
Unlike the "balance of power" system in which only actors of the
subclass national actor were considered as "essential, " the emerging
bipolar system included supra-national actors as well. Further the class
of supranational actors is divided into two-subclasses: bloc actors, of
which NATO and the Communist bloc are examples; and "universal
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actors, " such as the United Nations. Of the bloc actors, the Communist
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bloc displayed hierarchical organizational features, while the Western
Bloc was non hierarchically organized. Because the functional inte-
gration within a hierarchically organized bloc is at a high level, it
becomes difficult for non-leading members to withdraw. As a result,
new members are usually attracted as the result of military absorption
or political ascendence of a native political party which already has
"associate" membership in the bloc through an international party or-
ganization. Furthermore, the pressure which the hierarchically
organized bloc system exerts upon the non-hierarchically organized
bloc is likely to force the non hierarchically organized bloc to integrate
its bloc activities more closely and to extend those activities to other
functional areas.
As for the leading national actors within each bloc, the United
States resisted British attempts, after the Second World War, to draw
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it into a responsible position in Middle Eastern politics. This position
changed, however, as a result of Soviet incursions into the area: ter-
ritorial demands upon Turkey in 1945, and the stationing of Soviet troops
in Iran in 1946, as well as its influence in the Greek civil war of 1946.
The major interest of the United States in the Middle East thus became
its desire to keep the Soviet Union out of the region as part of its overall
policy of containment. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union was
in a position to capitalize upon the three principal trends in contemporary
71
Arab nationalism: neutralism, anti-Zionism, and radicalism.
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Although the Soviet Union had acted in support of the creation of the State
of Israel, it now was able to exploit the regional tensions which developed
as a result of the implementation of a Western oriented state, identified
with the colonialist powers, in the midst of hostile Arab states, which
were themselves in the process of emerging as independent national
entities. As Bernard Lewis points out, "Russian colonialism was in
areas remote from Arab lands, and in forms unfamiliar to the Arab
peoples, who only knew the maritime, liberal, commercial empires of
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the West. " Consequently, unlike the United States, the Soviet Union
was able to pursue a policy aimed at achieving hegemony in the Middle
East, without being categorized as a colonialist power.
If the new "superpowers" or leading national bloc actors, were only
first discovering their position and their relative power in the inter-
national system, so, too, was the subsystemic challenge to that system
diffuse and unstructured. Amongst the regional actors, the conduct of
the Jew/Israelis was perhaps the most coherent. Nevertheless, the
political leadership which announced the creation of the Jewish State
did not possess the means to coerce its followers into disciplined action.
In addition to the Haganah, there were irregulars, radical military
organizations such as the Irgun. This lack of centralized authority is
evident in the following statement of Chaim Weizmann to the U.N. Com-
mittee on Palestine in 1947:
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"In all humbleness, "Thou shalt not kill" has been
ingrained in us since Mount Sinai. It was inconceiv-
able ten years ago that Jews should break this com-
raandraent. Unfortunately, they are breaking it today,
and nobody deplores it more than the vast majority of
Jews. I hang my head in shame when I have to speak
of this fact before you. "
As for the Arabs, despite pan-Arab rhetoric, the task of resisting
the formation of the state of Israel lay primarily with those directly
affected, namely the Palestinian Arabs. The forces of Arab states
outside of Palestine became involved only at the last minute, and then
primarily as an outgrowth of inter -Arab rivalry rather than as a unified
action against an emerging "colonialist" state. In addition, the Arab
states which did finally send forces to oppose the Jews were themselves
not truly independent and viable entities, but a collection of systemically
dominated, non representative regimes.
As for the Universal Actor, the United Nations was only three years
old at the time of the first Arab-Israeli war; its membership largely a
homogenious grouping of ex-colonial powers. Consequently, it was
unable to exercise any practical measure of control over the regional
conflict.
SUMMARY
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate the weakening of the
systemic powers' control over the Middle East regional system of
confrontation. This dissolution of control accompanied the transforma-
tion of the international system from one of increasingly rigid "balance

of power, " into a relatively bipolar system. It may be argued, that the
subsystemic challenge to the systemic dominance of the systera and the
success of that challenge was an aberration due to the fact that the first
Arab-Israeli war occurred during a period of transition from one inter-
national system to another. The old "essential actors" were becoming
less so, and the new bloc leaders were just beginning to formulate their
objectives in the contest for systemic dominance. Therefore, this
author prefers to view the subsystemic challenge to the international
order as an unfocused one; one in which the subsysteraic actors were
able to wrest the initiative away from the systemic actors because the
system was in a state of flux, and away from the universal actor because
its role could not be defined until the blocs had coalesced around their
leaders.
The following chapter will deal with the transformation of the
unstructured regional actors into true coherent actors and the con-
sequent focusing of the challenge to the international system. It will
also move away from Kaplan's theory of international systems and closer
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V. DEFINED SUBSYSTEMIC CHALLENGES TO A
BIPOLAR /POLITICALLY DISCONTINUOUS INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The years imraediately after the first Arab-Israeli war saw marked
changes in the participants in that war. This chapter will examine some
of those changes, including the emergence of modern Arab nations, the
growing independence of the state of Israel, and the changing relation-
ships of the major systemic actors to the Middle East subsystem. During
the course of this examination, some of Kaplan's terminology and theories
will be exchanged for the system of Political Discontinuities espoused by
Oran Young, To begin with, a survey of the major problem faced by
Arab nationalism and the effect of the creation of the state of Israel upon
it, is on order.
ARAB POLITICS AND THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMACY
One of the major problems faced by the Arabs during the first Arab-
Israeli war was that of trying to solidify the support of diffuse Arab
entities in the task of ridding themselves of the challenge of Israel.
The primary reason that this discipline was lacking and that there was
little solidarity among the Arab forces is the fundamental concern of
Arab politics: the problem of legitimacy. As David Easton puts it:
"The inculcation of a sense of legitimacy is
probably the single most effective device for
regulating the flow of diffuse support in favor
of the authorities and of the regime. A member
may be willing to obey the authorities and conform
to the requirements of the regime for many dif-
ferent reasons. But the most stable support will
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derive from the conviction on the part of the
member that it is right and proper for him to
accept and obey the authorities and to abide by
the requirements of the regime. It reflects
the fact that in some vague or explicit way he sees
these objects as conforraing to his own moral prin-
ciples, his own sense of what is right and proper in
the political sphere. The strength of support im-
plicit in this attitude derives from the fact that it is
not contingent on specific inducements or rewards
of any kind, except in the very long run. "
If the Arab states were to effectively challenge the state of Israel,
therefore, it is essential that the leadership of those states be con-
sidered legitimate. To approach the legitimacy problem of an Arab
state without reference to conditions and issues comraon to all Arabs,
or to what many Arabs refer to as the Arab nation, would result in an
3incomplete analysis. One of the factors external to a particular state
which nonetheless has a great effect upon perceived legitimacy of that
states' regime is what Clovis Mahsoud, a Lebanese, referred to as all-
Arab core concerns. The legitimacy of given leaders in a given state
is determined to a great degree by their espousal of these core concerns
At the present time, as Hudson points out, the foremost all-Arab con-
4
cern is Palestine.
EFFECTS IF THE 1948 WAR UPON THE "CONFRONTATION STATES "
JORDAN: There were dramatic changes to the political system of
Jordan after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. The Arab Legion held the West
Bank of the Jordan River and the Eastern part (or old city section) of
Jerusalem. In December of that year, a conference of West Bank

leaders proclaimed King Abdullah the King of Palestine, and by 1950 he
formally annexed the territory. Thus was born the new nation of the
Kingdom of Jordan. The state had a mixed population of relatively
sedentary and better educated Palestinians on the one hand, and a
traditional. Bedouin tribal society on the other. These two differing
constituencies greatly complicated the ruling family's legitimacy problem.
The nature of the internal tension which existed within the new kingdom
barkened back to the classical Middle Eastern distinction between the
5
desert and the settled societies, as expressed by Ibn Khaldun.
As mentioned earlier, the problem of Arab legitimacy also involved
an external dimension. In the case of Jordan it was the thrusting of the
traditional land of Transjordan, which had been a relatively untroubled
desert shaykdom, by means of the Palestinian conflict between Jews and
Arabs, into the mainstream of Arab nationalism which had emerged since
6
"World War I. Jordan was certainly no bystander to the Palestinian
trauma; it was directly involved. Although the successes of the Arab
Legion in the war had improved Jordan's position in the Arab community,
7
its longstanding association with Britain weighed against it. In addition,
the regimes' Arab nationalist credentials were challenged by such compe-
titors as Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. Much political hay was made of
the fact that the same family that had won two kingdoms after the defeat
\ of Arab nationalism in the First World War, had now joined with the new
8




The events in Palestine were undoubtedly an important determinant
of the Weltans chauung of the Free Officers group which was to come to
political power in Egypt. Although Nasir wrote that the 1948 war did
9
not directly cause the revolution of 1952, it is clear that Palestine was a
significant factor in unifying the Free Officers and precipitating their
action. Nasir himself fought in Palestine and, according to Hudson,
had contacts with Israelis officers when the force he was leading was
10
surrounded. For Nasir, Palestine was not foreign soil, and its
defense was "a duty imposed by self defense, " for, he went on, "I
bd ieve that what is happening in Palestine could happen and may still
happen today, in any part of this region, as long as it resigns itself to
the factors and the forces which dominate it now. "
SYRIA
12Syrian politics has traditionally been family politics. Seale
enumerates the many factions in competition for political power and
describes their inability to cooperate in the erection of a stable political
order after the French withdrawal of 1946, even though the position of
these elite families as a ruling class was threatened. This threat was
a result of Syria's social mobilization, the popular appeal of new
nationalist and socialist ideologies, and the "intolerable strain of defeat
1 3in the 1948 Palestine war. " According to Hudson:

"As for Palestine, its impact was major and was
felt in many ways. The Syrian army's inept per-
formance in 1948 revealed the real dimension of
Zionist power and made the Palestine struggle
more of an issue than it had been before independ-
ence. It also crystallized the animosity between
the military and the new nationalist establishment.
The military were bitter about the civilian politic-
ian's misperception of the Israeli threat and their
failure to have built up the army. The civilian
notables, who generally considered the army a
lower status social institution, were scathing in
their criticisms of corruption within the military
after the debacle . . . Palestine in short became
an explosive issue, catalyzing perceptions of the
incompetence of the upper-bourgeois nationalist
elite, and as a manifestation of the need for Arab
unity; on both counts the Ba'th, at least until the
middle 1970's was the most successful of all cora-




The legacy of the 1948 war took longer to manifest itself in Lebanon
than in the other confrontation states. Although Lebanon had traditionally
sought to maintain strong ties to the west, it did, of necessity as an Arab
state, support the Arab war against Israel. Since the loss of that war,
however, Palestinian refugees have comprised a large and significant
community in Lebanon, not just in refugee camps but also in the major
cities where many of them prospered. Consequently when the pro-
Israeli policy of the United States provoked anti-American demonstrations,
they were, due to the pro-western bias of the Maronite elite, less violent
than those in Syria, Iraq, or Egypt. As early as June 1951, Lebanon's
delegate to the United Nations made a speech foreshadowing Lebanon's

de facto recognition of the state of Israel, even referring to the role that
Israel would play, along with the Arab States, in defending the Middle
15
East from extra-regional aggression. The internal tensions arising
from the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, and the growing numbers and
political influence of the Palestinian refugees would fester under Lebanon
cosmpolitan surface and eventually erupt, with disastrous results.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISRAELI NATIONAL ACTOR
With the 1947 announcement by the British of their intention to bring
to an end their mandate in Palestine, the Zionist leadership took im-
mediate steps in order to bring fruition their long held plans for an
independent Jewish State. In response to Arab objections to the creation
of such a state, many Zionists, affected by both their Western images of
the backward and violent Arab, and their experiences or knowledge of
the horrors of Nazi dominated Europe, believed that the Arabs planned
to overrun Palestine and drive them into the sea. Not only were they of
one mind in that those things should not occur, they actually were exhil-
arated by the prospect of being in charge of their own destinies.
The establishment of the state of Israel and its recognition by vir-
tually every Western state, was indeed a victory for the Zionists. The
military defeat of the Arab armies did not bring with it a resolution of
the conflict, however. Neither the Palestinians nor the Arab govern-
ment were willing to acknowledge their military defeat as a sign of
Israel's success. For its part, Israel's policy towards the Arab states
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during this period was largely determined by two factors: (1) the pending
territorial aims of the Zionist movement, prefiguring the current
call for "secure borders, " and (2) the refusal of the Palestinians to
17
accept their displacement from their homeland.
Ibrahim Abu-Lughod defines, therefore, the three major objectives
of Israel's Arab policy:
"... first, to break the back of what remained of
Palestinian resistance; second, to serve notice to
the adjacent states that, should they harbor Palestinian
resistance movements in territories under their juris-
diction, they would automatically invite intervention
by Israeli armed forces in their domestic affairs;
and third, to maintain a high but tolerable level of
tension on Israel's frontiers in order to serve the
internal political purposes of the state - namely,
strengthening the bond of its citizens and consolidat-
18ing its hold over external supporters. "
Acting upon these goals, Israel worked to develop the military capa-
bility which would lead to Arab acceptance of Israel, as constituted after
1948. Although Arab opposition was viewed as unrealistic and irrational,
Israel avoided a large scale military confrontation with opposing Arab
states as long as those states were predominantly concerned with in-
ternal problems and the continuing inter-Arab rivalries. As a result,
there emerged a balance of power between Israel and the Arab states
1 9
which allowed Israel to concentrate on its own internal development. ''
The years imraediately after the first Arab-Israeli war were marked
by the development of Israeli political institutions and the building up of
20
a military capability which was able to defeat potential Arab attacks.
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The army became an excellent socializing structure for Jewish immi-
grants of diverse backgrounds. According to Ben-Gurion, "the persist-
ant antagonism of the Arabs before the establishment of the state led to
a more cohesive Jewish community in the country . . . Since then, con-
21
tinued Arab enmity has been a stimulant to the development of Israel. "
In a similar fashion the economic challenge presented by the Arab boycott,
while proving a minor deterrent to economic growth, fostered the auto-
22
nomous development of the Israeli economy.
With operational codes strongly influenced by the recent experiences
in Europe during the Nazi reign of terror, the Israeli leadership main-
tained that not only did the Arabs seek the elimination of the Israeli state;
they sought the eradication of its people as well. Consequently, with the
exception of Jordan's King Abdullah, no direct negotiations were entered
into with any of the Arab leadership. Abdullah himself was assassinated
23in 1951 before any of these bilateral talks could come to fruition.
Consistent with its belief that only force or the threat of force would
convince the Arab states to sue for peace and act to restrain Palestinian
political and military activities originating within their borders, Israel
began to apply a program of systemic attack and reprisal along the
24
Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian armistice lines.
CHANGING COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
If the identities of the regional actors were changing and becoming
more focused, changes were occurring in the United Nations as well.

starting with fifty-one members in 1945, the organization, during its
early years, had been pre-occupied with and influenced by the interests
of those essentially European states. However, by 1955, the process
of decolonization, which had marked the post-1945 political system,
began to be reflected in the membership of the United Nations. By 1955,
the percentage of the United Nations membership composed of newly
25
emerged states had increased from zero percent to thirteen percent.
As the leading bloc actors, the United States and the Soviet Union, com-
peted for the support of the new Afro-Asian states, which were achieving
political influence in the U.N. due to the increasingly permissive ad-
mission policies of that organization. As a result of these policies,
the composition of the General Assembly of 1955 was much different
from that of the first decade. Four of the sixteen states admitted in
1955 were communist countries and six were either Asian or African
27
states. By 1965, there were thirty-one African states, thirteen Arab
states, seventeen Asian states and ten communist states amongst the
28 'membership of the Assembly. The emergence of these new states
not only influenced the character and decision making process of the
United Nations, but affected the stability of the bipolar international
political system as well.
THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
-
\
Kaplan has written that, even under the best conditions, a bipolar




of power" international system. In his bipolar model, the uncom-
mitted states were expected to play a major role, both within and without
the structure of a universal actor such as the United Nations, in the
search for systemic stability. These uncommitted states of the raodel
were envisioned as being similar to the modern developed states of Europe,
and Kaplan argues that the system would indeed be more stable if they
were. Empirically, however, these states have turned out to be new and
undeveloped, remembering a resented colonial past. Further, they have
suffered from social and racial prejudice and have in turn their own
prejudices against the ex-colonial nations, which are all Western nations,
30
and with which the United States is identified.
"These facts provide the experience which helps
to mold the uncommitted states, to shape their
picture of the world, and to determine their at-
titudes to other nations. That these new nations,
for the most part, are revolutionary, not merely
in the sense of wanting independence, but also in
the sense of wanting political and social changes,
that they are suspicious, determined, and in haste,
are facts that affect the stability of the bipolar sys-
tem and that weigh the clash between the United
31States and the Soviet Union. "
The emergence of these new, uncommitted states leads to a re-
assessment of the continuing validity of Kaplan's bipolar model. Im-
mediately following the Second World War, the dominance of the two
superpowers became so evident that bipolarity appeared to be the most
accurate representation of reality. During these years, although individ-
ual actors appeared whose interaction was within a given region, well

defined regional subsystems were in only a formative stage. These
subsystems, the Middle East, for example, were either dominated by
the superpowers or sufficiently peripheral so as to not disturb the es-
32
sentially bipolar orientation of the international system. Oran Young
points to development in more recent years which challenge the appro
-
33priateness of the bipolar axis in international politics:
(1) As the period of time since a large scale war lengthened,
there was no polarization to simplify the patterns of inter-
national politics.
(2) There has been a gradual diffusion of effective power
within the system. The very preponderance of the
physical power, of the superpowers, as manifested by
their nuclear capabilities, has occasionally constrained
their freedom of action vis a vis a regional power.
(3) New power centers of major significance have arisen,
even though they are still far less influential than the
superpowers.
(4) The demise of colonialism ended a major simplifying factor
of earlier periods of international politics, leading to the
rapidly growing number of new independent states since
1945.
(5) There has been a general rise in levels of political con-




(6) The superpowers, while continuing to compete for influence
in the various regional subsystems are becoming aware of
certain areas where their interests overlap and where
cooperation benefits thera both.
Young concludes, therefore, that:
"The upshot of all these developments is that the
major simplifying assumptions of the bipolar world
of the fifties either are no longer valid or are in-
creasingly hedged about by a variety of complicating
relationships on a subsidiary level. The regional
subsystems, therefore, are now coming more and
more into their own as a complement to the global
nature of the overall international system. "
It is my opinion that the characteristics of Young's political discon-
tinuities model first began emerging in the mid-fifties, with the Hungarian
Revolution in Europe and the Suez crisis in the Middle Eastern sub-
system. It is to this crisis that we will now direct our inquiry.
THE SUEZ CONFLICT
Upon Nasir's assumption of political power in Egypt, he was con-
fronted by a morass of domestic and foreign problems requiring solution.
Although the Israeli victory in the first Arab-Israeli conflict had exposed
the weakness of the Egyptian army, the period of relative entente which
accompanied Moshe Sharett's tenure as Israeli premier did not force
Nasir to take steps to correct the deficiencies. In February 1955,
however, the concluding month of the Sharett regime, the Lavon-Affair-
designed by the Israelis' to influence the British to maintain their forces
in Egypt - brought militant Ben-Gurion back into power in Israel. One
95

week later, Israel resumed its earlier abrogated policy of massive
34
retaliation for forays of individual armed Palestinians into Israel.
As Israeli attacks along the Egyptian border continued, Nasir fell under
increasing pressure from his dome stic power base, the army. One
motive for the resolution of 1952 had been, after all, the humiliating
Egyptian defeat of 1948. Many Egyptian officers, including Nasir him-
self, had attributed the defeat, at least in part, to the poor and mal-
functioning arms with which, due to the corruption of prior royal regimes,
35
they had been sent into battle. In February 1955, the Israeli army
attacked Egyptian military outposts in Gaza. This raid provided the
"turning point" in Egypt's relationship as regional bloc leader with the
36
leaders of the systemic blocs.
These Israeli raids seriously undermined Nasir's main source of
regime legitimacy: the army. According to General Burns, Chief of
Staff of the U.N. Forces:
"Shortly before the raid, he (Nasir) had visited Gaza
and told the troops that there was no danger of war;
that the Gaza Armistice Demarcation Line was not
going to be a battlefront. After that, many of them
had been shot in their beds. Never again could he
risk telling the troops they had no attack to fear;
never again could he let them believe that they
could relax their vigilance. It was for this reason
that he could not issue and enforce strict orders
against the opening of fire on the Israeli patrols
which marched along the demarcation line, a hundred
meters or less from the Egyptian positions. These
positions were held by the friends and perhaps the
relatives of the men who had perished in the Israeli
ambush of the bloody night.
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Nasir's quest for arras was complicated by the so-called Tripartite
Declaration of 1950 by the three main Western powers, the United States,
Britain and France, in which they pledged themselves to action, within
or without the United Nations, to resist any attempt by either Israel or
the Arabs to change the 1949 armistice lines by force of arms. Con-
sequently, they refused to supply arms to the Arab states and Israel
except "for the purposes of assuming their internal security and their
legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the de-
38
fense of the area as a whole. " Nasir, on the other hand had to face
the indignation of the Palestinians in their riots and demonstrations
which threatened the stability of his young and relatively insecure regime,
Mob violence spread from Gaza, to Yunis, to Rafah. As Egyptian sol-
diers entered these areas to restore calm, they were greeted with stones
39
and shouts of "arms, give us arms, we shall defend ourselves. " Con-
sequently, Nasir was pressured into obtaining a source of new arms as
soon as possible. Although President Eisenhower described Egypt's
request for $20 million worth of arms as sheer "peanuts, " the United
States insisted on payment in hard currency, fully aware that Egypt,
40
with total reserves of $20 million would be unable to agree. Con-
sequently, Nasir announced, in September of 1955, that Czechoslovakia
would supply large quantities of late model military equipment to Egypt
via a barter arrangement for Egyptian cotton.
This arrangement was met with concern in the United States, for
it appeared that the 'horthern tier" defense line had been scaled by the

Soviets. Nonetheless, in Polk's words:
"Nasser had done what no other Arab had thought
possible. He had used the Cold War to inter-
nationalize Arab affairs and so, apparently,
gained a lever to extract better terms from both
the West and the East. "^^
In addition, he had done it at a relatively modest price. According to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "the terms of the
Czechoslovak arms deal appear to have been very favorable:prices
were low and payment was in cotton. There was no need to attach poli-
tical strings. As Nasir said, 'These were entirely unconditional. We
simply had to pay their cost . . . These arms now belong to us. ' It was
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the first example of pre-emptive supply. "
Yet another major decision was taken by Nasir at approximately
this same time, in the wake of the Gaza raid. Hitherto, the infiltration
of individual Palestinian guerillas into Israeli territory had not been
recognized or overtly supported by any legitimate Arab regime. Yet,
in August, Nasir incorporated the fedayeen - those who sacrifice them-
selves - into the framework of Egyptian foreign policy. As a matter of
fact, their first raid began on the same day that Nasir finally committed
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himself to the purchase of Soviet arms.
The Western powers, still hoped to keep Egypt within their sphere
of influence. Consequently, when the Egyptian government announced
plans to construct a new high dam at Aswan, which, by increasing the
country's hydroelectric supply, would form the basis of Egypt's development
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program, a provisional agreement was reached, in February, 1956,
whereby the World Bank would loan $200 million on the condition that
45
the United States and Britain agreed to loan another $70 million.
According to Lenczowski, these offers were made with an understanding
that Egypt would provide matching funds and that it would not accept
46
Soviet aid.
In the meanwhile, the Soviets had expressed an interest in financing
the project, and the Egyptian press continued to attack the United States
and the West for what it considered excessive restrictions upon the fur-
nishings of economic and military aid. In addition, Egypt, antagonized
the West, and the United States in particular by recognizing Communist
China on 16 May, 1956. There is some dispute as to Egypt's motive
for extending recognition to China. Some feel it was yet another act of
defiance aimed toward the West, while others, Safran, in particular,
view the recognition as merely the establishment of an alternative source
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of arms.
Whatever the reason for Egypt's recognition of China, it was the
final factor leading up to the United States' refusal to assist in the fin-
ancing of the project on 19 July, 1956, claiming that the Egyptian economy
was too unstable for such a large undertaking. As a result, Nasir an-
nounced in Alexandria, on 26 July that the Suez Canal Company was
nationalized and that the Canal would be managed henceforth by an
Egyptian Canal Authority. He declared Egypt's intention to build the
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High Dam with the revenues of the Canal and said that if the imperialist
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powers did not like it they could "choke on their rage. "
Britain responded to this move by organizing a movement to place
the Canal under international supervision, and called for a conference to
discuss the matter in London. The majority of the participants (includ-
ing the United States, opposed the use of military force to wrest control
from Nasir's regime and place it in the hands of an international adminis-
tration). Thus, there was no possibility of imposing extra-regional con-
trol through co-operative international action. The next move of the
British and French governments was to reraove all of their pilots from the
Canal Company in an effort to force the closing of the waterway. Nasir,
however, through the use of Egyptian pilots as well as some from sympa-
thetic countries, was actually able to increase canal traffic.
Subsequently, the French, British, and Israeli governments entered
into an agreement at Sevres, France in 24 October, which called for an
Israeli attack upon Egyptian territory, aided by the British and the French.
In terms of risk, the Israelis stood to lose little and gain much, including
the opening of the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. As for the French,
they were already involved, in Algeria, in a war against Arab nationalism,
and thus stood to profit from the overthrow of the regime which it felt
aided and abetted the Algerian rebels. Britain, on the other hand, stood




On 29 October, the Israeli army invaded Sinai and captured all of it,
including the island of Tiran in the Gulf of Aqaba. Their advance took just
four days. On 30 October, both Britain and France issued an ultimatum
calling for the withdrawal of the Israeli and Egyptian forces to ten kilo-
meters from the Canal, and threatening Anglo-French intervention to see
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that it was carried out. Considering that the Israeli forces were no-
where near the canal at the time the ultimatum was issued, their "with-
drawal" would have actually meant a substantial advance. On 31 October,
subsequent to Egyptian rejection of the ultimatum, British and French
planes began to attack Egyptian airfields and broadcast stations. On
5 November, an Anglo-French invasion force captured Port Said and
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began to move south along the canal.
The United States attempted to obtain the withdrawal of the invading
forces through both direct pressure upon the respective governments and
through diplomatic initiatives at the United Nations. Although the Soviet
Union seconded the United States' effort in the United Nations, and sent
diplomatic messages to the participants, it was relatively ineffective
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in actually coercing the protagonists to a cease fire. As Sadat states
in his autobiography, Shukri Al-Kuwatli, the Syrian president was on an
official visit to the Soviet Union during the time of the heaviest fighting.
"He spoke to the Soviet leaders about the Canal
battle and asked them to extend a helping hand
to Egypt. However, they refused point blank,
whereupon Al-Kuwalti sent word to us to that
effect and advised us to rely upon ourselves, as
no hope at all could be pinned on the Soviet Union.
This made me believe, from that moment on, that
it was always futile to depend on the Soviet Union, "
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On 6 November, the British and French accepted an American
instigated cease fire and declared their intention to withdraw from occu-
pied territories as soon as the United Nations Emergency Force could
take over their positions. On 8 November, Israel agreed to withdraw
from most of the territory it had occupied, although full withdrawal would
not occur for another six months, and that only due to the threat of inter-
national economic sanctions.
SUEZ AFTERMATH: SOME THOUGHTS ON LINKAGE POLITICS
Linkage politics has to do with the relationship between the units
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under investigation and their environment. Thus, linkages can exist
between the domestic politics of a given state and its international be-
havior, as well as between regional events and the structure of the extra-
regional political system. Thus, Nasir's decision to go ahead with the
Czech arms deal may be seen as operating on at least three levels:
(1) DOMESTIC . Nasir's domestic political base was depend-
ent upon the support of the Egyptian military. The weapons
which they possessed were not the equal of Israel's, and as
a result of the West's hesitancy to supply the quantity of
arms which Nasir felt was needed, he was pressured to
obtain an alternate source of supply.
(2) REGIONAL . In his quest for leadership of the emerging
Arab nationalist movements, Nasir's decision to turn his
back upon the ex-colonial powers and deal instead with
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their systemic rival was seen as an act of heroism and
helped reinforce his legitimacy as a regional leader.
(3) GLOBAL . Nasir's decision affected the United States-
Soviet corapetition for influence in the Middle East. Thus,
the arms agreement led to additional Soviet economic and
military aid, and resulted in increased U.S. involvement
in order to maintain its influence in the region against
Soviet advances.
Conversely, occasionally the linkages between foreign and domestic
affairs work in an unexpected manner. For example, the joint Anglo-
French attack upon Egypt had as one of its goals the weakening of the
Egyptian political regime which they perceived as inimicable to their
regional interests. Rather than weakening domestic support for Nasir,
however, the air raids on Egyptian soil served only to bolster his popularity
Linkages between foreign and domestic policies do not exist solely
amongst the regional actors, however, It has been argued that American
reluctance to aid in the financing of the Aswan High Dam was as much the
result of domestic politics as it was a coherent foreign policy. According
to Lenczowski, Egypt's request for Western aid in the financing of the
Dam was rebuffed not only because of Nasir's tilt toward the Soviets,
but because of the "opposition by southern senators fearful of the compe-
tition of Egyptian cotton should the Dam be constructed and by a few





One other major result of the Suez Canal Crisis was the diminuition
of British and French influence in the area, leaving the United States and
the Soviet Union alone to vie for influence. In this regard, it seems that
the "collusion" between the Soviet Union and the United States in applying
pressure on the British, French and Israelis to withdraw came as a sur-
prise to the partners in the campaign. It can be supposed that the Israelis,
French and English, upon comraencing hostilities, found the international
situation encouraging. First, they believed that the Soviet Union would
probably be deterred from action by the United States. Second, they
assumed that although the United States did not support the tripartite
attack against Egypt, it would probably not take definitive action against
it just a few days before the American presidential election. Finally,
they believed that the countries of the region were weak enough that a
quick and successful military operation might achieve their objectives
with minimal regional and international costs, such as alliance rifts,
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international negative reactions, and so on. Thus, the intensity of
joint United States -Soviet Union pronouncements and diplomatic activity
against the campaign came as a demoralizing blow. The resultant with-
drawal of British and French influence in the area thus destroyed the
possibility of the rivalry between the two superpowers being effectively
mediated or moderated by the action of other powers as used to happen
in the classical balance of power system. This withdrawal of British
and French influence is mentioned by former President Nixon as one of the
reasons he feels American policy during the crisis was in error:
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"Eisenhower and Dulles put heavy public pressure
on Britain, France, and Israel to withdraw their
forces from Suez. In retrospect I believe that our
actions were a serious mistake. Nasser became
even more rash and aggressive than before, and
the seeds of another Mideast war were planted.
The most tragic result was that Britain and France
were so humiliated and discouraged by the Suez
crisis that they lost the will to play a major role
on the world scene. From this time forward the
United States would by necessity be faced to "go
it alone" in the foreign policy leadership of the free
world. I have often felt that if the Suez crisis had
not arisen during the heat of a presidential election
campaign a different decision would have been made. "
It should not be assumed, however, that the Middle Fast was in the
"middle" between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is clear
that the great power relationship had and continues to have an important
bearing on Middle Eastern affairs, but the latter may not be understood
wholey or even primarily in terms of the major international system. If
that major system can be considered as being bipolar, the subsystem
demonstrated that there was near equality in the roles of each Middle
Eastern state, an equality limited only by domestic political circum-
stances. These factors added up to an inherently unstable system.
And one in which the ability of the major or systemic actors to coerce
regional actors to serve extra-regional interests was rapidly diminishing,
1956-1967
At first glance, the powers that had invaded Egypt in 1956 seemed
to have gained little from their initiative, since Nasir remained in power
and the invading armies were all required to withdraw. As for Israel,
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it achieved only the opening of the Straits of Tiran so that the port of
Eilat might be used. This opening was not incorporated in any formal
treaty, and thus, the subsequent Egyptian assertion of its right to close
what it regarded as territorial water to Israeli shipping was a major
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contributing cause to the outbreak of fighting a decade later. There
was, however, very real significance in the United Nations Emergency
Force which had interposed itself between Egyptian and invading forces
in the Suez Canal Zone and then was moved to the truce line between
Israel and Egypt. According to Quester, such a force changed the
calculations and miscalculations on possible wars in three iraportant
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ways :
(1) The presence of these forces as observers and hostages
reduced the mutual fear of sudden sneak attacks since
each side knew that the other was much more likely to
launch an attack while these forces were in the way. Con-
61
sequently, there was an easing of the "prisoner's dilemraa"
problem as each side had an added incentive to wait and see
in a future crisis.
(2) The UN force made it more difficult for either side to carry
on a war of endurance by the guerrilla-terrorist canapaigns
that had characterized the sector prior to 1956.
(3) Nasir's acceptance of the forces had the effect of reducing
Arab expectations that he would be the initiator of a new
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military campaign against Israel. Thus, Nasir was able
to avoid an open admission of defeat, and yet have a con-
venient excuse for not resuming warfare.
If the UNEF forces prevented guerrilla attacks on the Sinai border,
the attacks continued on other fronts. Fedayeen raids from Jordan and
Syria continued, while in the Arab capitals there was hope that these
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raids presaged a victorious Arab revenge in the future.
Throughout the latter part of 1956, the Fedayeen raids into Israel, .
sometimes moving through Jordan or Lebanon, but for the most part
mounted in Syria, grew in numbers and in intensity. Israel appealed to
the United Nations Security Council, however, a resolution proposed by
six of its members, calling on Syria to take stronger methods to prevent
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such incidents, was vetoed by the Soviet Union.
A new, radical Syrian regime had come to power as the result of a
coup d'etat earlier that year. It supported the so-called Palestine
Liberation Army, which had mobilized some of the refugees and carried
out some of the raids. The Syrian Prime Minister, in response to the
attempted United Nations resolution declared; "We are not the sentinels
over Israel's security and are not the leash that restrains the revolution
of the displaced and persecuted Palestinian people. " Furthermore, a
"defense agreement" was concluded between Syria and the United Arab
Republic, which included a joint military command and other measures
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of "coordination and integration between the two countries. "
107

On the 13th of November, 1966, Israel launched a retaliatory raid
against Es Samu, a Jordanian village, where, according to United Nations
observers, eighteen Jordanian soldiers and civilians were killed, and
fifty-four wounded. The fact that Jordan rather than Syria was the
target of this retaliation evoked sharp criticism in the international
community. Although Israel explained its activity by citing thirteen
recent acts of sabotage committed on Israeli territory from Jordanian
bases, the consequences of this disproportionate and misplaced retalia-
tion were considerable.
The United Nations Security Council censured Israel for a large
scale military action in violation of the United Nations charter and of
the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan. Further,
the Jordanian Prime Minister charged that the Egyptian and Syrian
regimes were not bearing their share of the weight of the confrontation
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with Israel, in a attempt to provoke them to action.
From January to April, 1967, the Syrian-Israeli border was fre-
quently disturbed by skirmishes between the opposing sides. Nasir,
for his part, was being pressured to make good on his rhetorical dia-
tribes against Israel and the West, particularly the United States.
Harkabi accurately describes the self fulfilling prophecy of Arab rhetoric
thus:
"Let us assume that Arab leaders express opinions
about Israel in which they do not believe at all.
The result then would be the creation of a gap or
dissonance between their words and opinions or
beliefs. Such a gap makes people feel uncomfortable,
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and they would therefore like to narrow it down
. . .
As a result of this process, the authors of
the declarations tend to believe in their own
statements. "
On the other hand, it appears that as early as 1965, Nasir attempted
to counter the verbal brinkmanship of the other Arab states. Addressing
a Palestinian audience, he said:
"They say 'drive out UNEF. ' Suppose that we do.
Is it not essential to have a plan? If Israeli ag-
gression takes place against Syria, do I attack
Israel? That would mean that Israel is the one
to determine the battle for me. It hits a tractor
or two to force me to move; is this a wise way?
It is we who must determine the battle. "
Much has been written concerning the passing of erroneous informa-
tion concerning Israeli troop buildups, to the Egyptians by the Soviets.
The question which comes to mind is whether the Soviets were deliberately
trying to provoke a war between the two states. Part of the answer lies
in the fact that the Soviet Union had made a large investment in the new
Syrian regime. The regime, in turn, not only paid loud and frequent
homage to Marxist slogans, but also included a few avowed Communist
ministers in the government. Consequently, the protection of the Syrian
regime became a vested interest for those within the Soviet leadership
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which had encouraged a policy of large scale assistance.
The Syrian government, whose domestic programs met with anti-
pathy, sought to bolster its support by engaging in a vehement anti-
Israeli policy. Consequently, in order to provide support for the regime,
the Soviets sought to influence Nasir into a token demonstration of
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support for the Syrian anti-Israeli campaign. In order to do this, they
provided the Egyptians with a copy of an Israeli contingency plan which
called for a large scale attack against Syrian positions, without making
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it clear that it was, in fact, a contingency plan.
Thus, although Nasir, unable to obtain verification of the Soviet
claim of "up to eleven divisions" of Israeli troops concentrating on the
Syrian border, must have known the information to be false, he set in
force the raobilization which was to begin the crisis:
"Nasir must not only have known that the informa-
tion was false, but he must have also figured that
the Russians knew that it was false, and knew he
knew it was false. In that case, he could only
interpret the Russian move as an invitation to
him to join them in spreading the false charges
against Israel and to use this as an excuse to
stir up the question of Israeli-Arab military
relations with their iraplicit support . . .
A second, no less crucial reason why Nasir decided
to act as if the Russian information were true is
that in a certain particular sense he believed it to
be essentially true. He knew that there were no
Israeli concentrations at that time, but he was
convinced that an Israeli large scale attack on
Syria was very likely to take place sooner or later.
The reason for this conviction is that for some
time he had been expecting the United States to
try to destroy him, and he looked on the tension
between Syria and Israel as offering the United
States a good opportunity to use Israel in order to
hit him indirectly by hitting at Syria. In other
words, Nasir had reached, through his own inde-
pendent thinking, conclusions that were quite
similar to those of the Russians. "
On 14 May 1967, Nasir sent military units towards the Suez canal
and the Sinai, ostensibly in response to the "information" considered
110

above. At 1430 (Egyptian time) the state of alert of Egyptian forces was
raised to "maximum alert" or "battle readiness" while on 15 May, the
anniversary of Israeli independence, Israel staged a military parade
through the demilitarized section of Jerusalem. On 16 May, Egyptian
Chief of Staff, General Muhammad Fawzi, sent a telegram to the com-
mander of the United Nations Emergency force. General Indar Jit Rihkye,
ordering him to withdraw at once. In New York, U Thant met with
«
Egyptian representatives to the United Nations and attempted to moderate
the Egyptian position by insisting that if the UNEF forces in the Sinai
were to be withdrawn, he would have to withdraw the forces at Sharm el
Sheikh as well.
It can be seen, therefore, that Nasir was not able to remain free
of this "Prisoner's Dilemma" if he were to maintain his position as
leader of the Arab world. If Israeli attacks were expected against
Syria, he may have felt compelled to join in. Consequently, it was
imperative that Nasir share the risks of war borne by Syria, Lebanon
and Jordan. In order to do this, he was compelled to give up whatever
peace insurance was provided by the UNEF forces still arrayed along
the Sinai border. While Nasir's expulsion of the Emergency Force
does not prove a desire on his part for an Egyptian-Israeli war, it
was a conscious choice to accept the increased risk of such a war.
Nasir's moves did catch Israel somewhat by surprise. However,
the general feeling in Israel was that these latest military maneuvers
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were still designed simply to be a "demonstrative show of solidarity
with Syria, " and that Egypt was "still opposed to military confrontation
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with Israel. "
Tension continued to build in the region and probably reached the
"point of no return" on 22 May 1967. Following a meeting of the Higher
Executive Committee of the Arab Socialist Union, Nasir announced in a
speech that the staits of Tiran were closed to Israeli shipping; both goods
carried on Israeli ships and ships of other nations bound for Eilat would
be barred. He declared that "the Israeli flag shall not go through the
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Gulf. " The closure of the Straits was regarded by the Israelis as a
causus belli, and was declared as much in 1956.
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Both Lacqueur and Yost seem to agree that the Soviets had not
been consulted prior to the closure of the straits, however, once the
decision had been taken, the Soviet leaders faced a serious dilemma.
The Soviet government had stated publicly that it would support the
Arabs, on the other hand, however, they had made it known directly to
Nasir that they would not support a Jihad
,
a holy war, against Israel
as the Arabs proclaimed. Soviet policy at this point was to give political
support to Nasir while working for a peaceful solution to the crisis which
would help consolidate Arab gains. Soviet public pronouncements at the
time were extremely anti-American, accusing the United States of having
fueled the crisis in an atterapt to divert world attention from its involve-
ment in Vietnam. Later, anti-American statements were toned down;
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clearly negotiations with Washington had gotten under way and the super-
powers had established ground rules for the dispute. America and Russia
would not intervene and they would both work for a de-escalation of the
conflict. Both Washington and Moscow sent notes to that effect to both
Cairo and Tel Aviv, but while Nasir promised that he would not fire first,
his major spokesman, Muhammad Heikal, announced that war was
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inevitable.
Then, on 30 May, King Hussein of Jordan flew to Cairo for a meet-
ing with Nasir and signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt, placing the
Jordanian army under Egyptian command. The final action that Israel
had long said would serve as a causus belli had been taken. For those who
had held out hope of a diplomatic solution, the point of no return had
been reached. As seen in Israel, the military union of the two erstwhile
enemies could serve no other purpose but as preparation for an attack on
Israel. In addition, this latest action by the Arabs intensified the poli-
tical division within Israel between the "hawks" and the "doves. " The
"hawks" scored a victory as the result of Moshe Dayan's inclusion in
the cabinet as Minister of Defense, an act not to be overlooked by Nasir
who stated that he now saw war as imminent. And, indeed, it was:
Israeli air strikes against the Arab positions began at 0845 Cairo time,
5 June, 1967.
On the Arab side of the conflict, Gamal Abdul Nasir was reacting
to his weakened position both at home and throughout the Arab world by

by re-asserting his position as the foremost proponent of Arab militarism.
The other Arab states, did not want to see Nasir obtain an easy political
victory by merely outbluffing the Israelis. Such a victory for Nasir might
weaken their own regimes, especially those of conservative Arab states
(e.g., Saudi Arabia, Jordan). As a result, their public statements
either matched Nasir 's in bellicosity, or attempted to outdo him, all of
which only fanned the flames of the conflict.
As for the Israelis, three inajor stimuli can be identified as prompt-
ing their decision to attack. First, the movement of Egyptian troops
across the Canal and the concomitant demand for the withdrawal of
UNEF forces, was perceived as a radical shift from the more "normal"
events of belligerency to which they had become used. Second, the
closure of the Straits of Tiran, which had been a causus belli in 1956,
was presented to the Israelis as a fait accompli which had erased all
the gains of the 1956 Suez campaign. While Israel had cause for alarm
over Sinai, the closure of the straits was seen as the direct threat of
war. Finally, the 30 May meeting of King Hussein and Nasir in Cairo
completed the Israeli perception that war was not only inevitable, but
76imminent.
THE THIRD ROUND
There have been countless books and articles written about the
actual conduct of the Six Day War. Consequently, only a brief summary
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will be presented in these pages:

On 5 June, 1967, Israel attacked seventeen Egyptian airfields and
destroyed most of the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. With coraplete
command of the air, Israeli forces won an easy victory in Sinai and
reached the Suez Canal early on 9 June. After the destruction of the
Egyptian Air Force, the Israelis turned against Jordan. On 7 June,
after the Old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank had fallen to Israeli
forces, Jordan accepted the United Nations Security Council's demand
for a cease-fire. Egypt accepted on the following day. With Egypt and
Jordan out of action, the Israelis turned against Syria, stormed up the
Golan Heights and occupied the town of Quneitra on the Syrian Plateau.
The Syrians accepted the cease-fire on 10 June. Contingents of Algerian,
Sudanese, and Kuwaiti troops sent to the Suez Canal front did not arrive
in time to affect the fighting.
Among the systemic actors, the Soviet Union mounted a massive
resupply effort upon the cessation of hostilities, although the new air-
craft deliveries were on order prior to the 5 June initiation of combat
operations. According to Aviation Week, within ten days of the cease-
fire of 10 June, "40 MIG-21 fighter aircraft from Algeria and 60 from
Czechoslovakia had arrived at UAR airfields. " An additional 50 MIG's
were believed to have arrived from other East European countries,





At the same time, Israeli trade specialists were implementing plans
to resupply their own air force, in the face of a French arms embargo.
As a result the United States emerged as the principal supplier of arms
to Israel, and Britain and France's influence in the area continued to
decline. It should be noted, however, that both America and the Soviet
Union's resupply efforts reached their peak after the cessation of
hostilities.
EFFECT OF THE WAR ON REGIONAL/SYSTEMIC RELATIONS
The military resupplying of client states who are the direct pro-
tagonists in a crisis or war may be seen, not as a coercive bargaining
tactic, but simply as a means by which the major systemic actors can
help their regional clients while avoiding direct confrontation between
themselves. They are able to bring power to bear in support of their
conflicting interests, but are able to shift responsibility for its violent
use to a proxy. However, if the major systemic powers also have a
common interest in dampening conflicts between their clients, their
capacity to supply them can also be given a bargaining interpretation.
The suppliers, therefore, are in a "Prisoner's Dilemma" in which each
tacitly communicates: "If you don't I won't" (cooperation) "but if you do,
I will" (defection). In the 196? war the United States and the Soviet
Union were able to cooperate in abstinance, but, as will be demonstrated,
in the 1973 war they were not. This developraent of military aid relation-
ships added another rung on the escalation scale of the nuclear powers.
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while it does provide flexibility of maneuver for the extra-regional actors,
it also has risks: first, the risk that clients abundantly supplied with
modern weapons are more likely to use them against each other, and
second, the risk that the suppliers themselves might inadvertently become
directly involved. The following are some additional observations made
concerning the 1967 conflict:
(1) The Israeli armed forces emerged as an acknowledged power
in the Middle East.
(2) The Soviet Union, although expected to suffer a setback in
regional influence because of the defeat of its clients, in-
stead increased its influence over the next few years.
(3) Much of the increase in Soviet influence can be linked directly
to their willingness to resupply their defeated clients. Nasir,
on 23 July, 1968, in a speech at the National Congress of the
Arab Socialist Union at Cairo University stated:
"Had it not been for the Soviet Union, we would now
find ourselves facing the enemy without any weapons
and compelled to accept his conditions. The United
States would not have given us a single round of am-
munition. It has given us and will give us nothing,
but it gives Israel everything, from guns to aircraft
to missiles. ^
(4) The United States emerged as guarantor of Israel's existence
and as its primary source of arms.
Before leaving the period of the 1967 war, one additional point is
relevant. Although the clients of the Soviet Union suffered what may

objectively be considered a defeat, and although there appears to have
been certain recriminations amongst the Soviet leadership itself as to the
error of supporting their Arab clients to the extent that they did, still
the Soviet Union, of the two major systemic actors, must be judged the
victor of this round of confrontation. The reason that this is so is that
the Arab opinion makers, political leaders, and press, never acknowledged
their "defeat. " Instead, the war was treated as an example of Israeli
aggression which the Arabs had finally been able to halt, thanks to the
continuing flow of arms from their ally, the Soviet Union. Consequently,
the Arab refusal to publicly admit defeat ameliorated what for the Soviets
would have been the expected result of their defeat: a diminution of
Soviet influence in the region.
What the above observation demonstrates is the manner in which the
regional subsystem imprints itself upon systemic events. The fact of
increasing Soviet influence in the region had nothing to do with any actions
taken by the systemic actors, but had all to do with the purely regional
requirement that the legitimacy of the Arab regimes not allow them to
acknowledge defeat. This seeming perversity in system-sub-system
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VI. EMERGING PATTERNS OF SUBSYSTEMIC DOMINANCE
The period of time from the end of the Six Day War until the present
has seen the Middle East subsystemic actors' challenge to the bipolar
dominance of the international system come to maturity. Due to arms
transfer policies pursued by the extra-regional suppliers, the growing
independence of the international system on Middle East oil, and the
increasing political independence of the subsystemic actors, the relation-
ship between the global system and the subsystem may be described as
subsystemically dominated. It appears that the Middle Eastern powers
have achieved a level of independence of action since the Six Day War
which may be corapared to the earlier attainment of formal independence
from the colonial system. This chapter will deal with the events follow-
ing the war, and attempt to identify some of the factors which have con-
tributed to the current state of system-subsystem relations.
TERRITORIAL THRUSTS AND DIPLOMATIC PARRIES
As a result of their victory in the 1967 war, the Israelis found
themselves in possession of new Arab territories. Israel occupied the
West Bank of the Jordan River, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and
the Sinai Peninsula. The acquisition of this territory was not without
its liabilities, however. Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, in a study





. . The Israelis may well look back with regret to the
days when Israel was almost as homogeneous a Jewish
State as its Zionist founders intended; for it will never
be that again. Two and a half million Jews now con-
trol territory containing nearly a million and a half
Arabs, and whatever settlement is made on the West
Bank, Arabs are likely in the future to make up at
least a quarter of Israel's population. Israel will be
confronted with all the problems of a multi-racial
society, in which the minority group is potentially
hostile and sustained by powerful consanguinous
supporters beyond the frontier.
The new territories are lacking in any significant natural resources
with the exception of a small amount of oil in Sinai. As a result, the
major significance of the occupied territories is political, strategic,
and emotional. From the standpoint of politico-strategic value, the new
territories, although they resulted in the multiplication of Jewish territory
sevenfold, had, as their result, the reduction of the length of the pre-
2
war borders by nearly one-third. Emotionally, the significance of the
occupied territories derives from their association with Jewish historical
memory since biblical times. This is most true in regards the West
Bank, the lands of Samaria and Judea, and, especially as regards the
3
city of Jerusalem.
It was Israeli attempts to reunify the divided city of Jerusalem which
led to the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 17 June, 1967,
calling upon Israel to "rescind all measures already taken and to desist
forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem. "




Consequently, the Assembly took "note with deepest regret and concern of
the non-compliance by Israel of resolution 2253. " As a result, it passed
5
another resolution, 2254, reiterating the terms of the former. Israel
once again refused to comply. There are several factors at work in
Israel's refusal to evacuate the Old City of Jerusalem, not the least of
which was its emotional and religious attachment for the holy city of
Judaism. Nevertheless, one must also consider the steadfastness with
which this regional actor was able to withstand systemic pressure, not
merely from the United Nations as universal actor in the international
system, but also from the United States itself, as one of the two major
systemic actors and as guarantor of Israel's existence and the major
supplier of aid and arms.
Despite continuing Israeli refusal to acquiesce to the request of the
Assembly, the Security Council, on 22 November, 1967, passed a
resolution which has been of paramount importance in any subsequent
discussions of a diplomatic resolution of the conflict. Resolution 242
was introduced by the British representative to the Council, Lord Caradon,
6
and was unanimously adopted. Because of its continuing importance in
the discussions concerning the Middle East conflict, it is reproduced
7





Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the
Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by
war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every
State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of
the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a comraitment to
act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the
establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East
which should include the application of both the following
principles
:
(i) "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories'!^
occupied in the recent conflict,
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and
respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every state in the area
and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized
boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through inter-
national waterways in the area;
(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political
independence of every State in the area, through measures
including the establishment of demilitarized zones.
={=The word "the" before "territories" was omitted from the English text
of the resolution, but the article is included in the French version.
This discrepancy allowed for further compromise as to whether all or
merely some of the territories were to be returned.
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3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Repre-
sentative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and main-
tain contacts with the States concerned in order to achieve a
peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the pro-
visions and principles of this resolution.
Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council
on the progress of the Special Representative as soon as possible,
Not only had the United States and the Soviet Union both supported
the resolution to no avail, the United States unilaterally called again for
its implementation in the 1969 Rogers Plan, in which U.S. Secretary of
State, William Rogers, publicly endorsed substantial withdrawal from
o
occupied territory in return for contractual peace with the Arabs.
ARMS TRANSFERS AND THE WAR OF ATTRITION 1968-1971
During the June war much of the Arab arsenal was lost. Moscow,
however, moved quickly to replace the losses. Within ten days of the
end of the war Soviet President Podgorny visited Cairo, and Soviet arms
shipments to Egypt were immediately resumed. Within a year, of the
first postwar shipments, Egypt had nearly regained its prewar numerical
aircraft strength. The largest portion of the replacements, however,
were with old fashioned MIG 15/17 type aircraft, while replenishments
9
of the modern MIG- 21 were slow in coming.
For its part, the United States had effectively replaced Western
Europe (and France in particular) as the main supplier of arms to Israel,
beginning in 1969-71 with deliveries of 42 A-4H Skyhawk attack aircraft
and 80 F-4 Phantoms. In fact, since shortly after the war the United
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states has been the major Israeli supplier of aircraft, raissiles, and
10
armored fighting vehicles.
In order to graphically present the quantitative and qualitative changes
occurring in the transfer of arms into the subsystem in the interwar
period, the following tables, drawn from data from the International
Institute for Strategic Studies have been included. Although the tables
are limited to combat aircraft inventories, they are indicative of the
general trend of arms transfers in the region.
The years between the third and the fourth rounds of the Arab-Israeli
conflict were not years of peace; rather, these years witnessed a "war
of attrition" between Nasir's Egypt and the Israelis. This war was fought
with increasingly sophisticated weaponry, provided by the United States
and the Soviet Union to their regional clients. By late 1969, the
Israeli air force was roaming at will over Cairo and the Nile Delta, not,
as yet, dropping bombs, but intimidating the population by repeatedly
breaking the sound barrier and creating "sonic booms. " In early
January, 1970, the Israelis embarked on "deep penetration" raids into
the delta and the suburbs of the capital. Flying newly acquired American
aircraft, they bombed the industrial installations at Kaanka, ten miles
northeast of Cairo, then returned in February to bomb Abu-Zabal, two
miles north of Kaanka, and killing 80 workers. In January, February,
and March they bombed military factories at Helwa and Digla, causing
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heavy damage and inhibiting Egypt's war production. On 8 April, 1970,
they struck a primary school at Bahr-al-Baqr, fifteen miles west of the
Canal, killing 30 children.
In January, 1970 Nasir went to Moscow to request more effective
air defense equipment. Although the Soviet Union declined to provide
more sophisticated aircraft, such as the MIG-25, or Su-9 interceptors,
it did agree to provide the SA-3 Surface to Air missile in order to counter
13
Israeli incursions into Egyptian territory. It appears that one reason
for the reluctance of the Soviets to provide the Egyptians with more
sophisticated aircraft was the Soviet fear that such aircraft might be
used in an offensive role, thus threatening superpower entangleraent in
the regional dispute on terms dictated by the subsystemic clients. Still
the agreement to provide the air defense missiles did demonstrate Soviet
willingness to help defend the Arab client states.
Furthermore, the Soviets agreed to supply approximately 150 pilots
to Nasir, half of them as instructors and advisors, and the other half
virtually a complete Soviet squadron, flying the latest MIG-21 fighters.
Whereas earlier the Soviets had been advising the Egyptians as to how to
use the older SA-2 rockets, the new SA-3's would be manned entirely
by Russians. By late Spring, some 15,000 Soviet military advisors
14
were in Egypt.
The Egyptians were not the only ones to experience some uncertainty
as to the reliability of their channels of arms supply. After the French
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arms embargo of 1967, Israeli Prmier Eshkol attempted to persuade
President Johnson to supply modern aircraft to Israel. Although Johnson
hesitated at first, the deliveries of the A-4 Skyhawks commenced three
months after Eshkol's January 1968 visit to the United States, and in
December that year it was decided to acquiesce to the Israeli request
15
for the more sophisticated F-4 Phantom.
The American decision to supply Israel came none too soon. President
De Gaulle had imposed a total embargo on arms to Israel as a result of
Israel's use of French helicopters in the raid on the Beirut airport of
28 December 1968. The development of an indiginous Israeli arms
industry and the new American arms commitment helped counter any
16
deleterious effect the French action may have had.
As an example of the role which arms supplies to the regional pro-
tagonists plays in regional political decisions, it should be noted that
it was after his return from his trip to the Soviet Union that Nasir
agreed to accept the Rogers Peace Plan, because he now felt that Egypt
had adjusted the railitary balance and could therefore begin negotiations
with territorial security. On the night that the cease fire was to take
place, however, Nasir moved the Soviet missiles closer to the Suez
Canal, thus angering the American administration, and resulting in a
U.S. pro-Israeli tilt which was to last for the next two years.
The decisions taken by the United States and the Soviet Union to
supply their respective area clients were motivated by other factors than
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altruism, or, for that matter, a simple desire to project systemic pres-
ence into the region. The "war of attrition" provided both weapons sup-
pliers with an opportunity to test the effectiveness of their more sophisti^
cated weapons against the weapons of their global rival, while using
regional clients as their proxies.
THE WAR OF THE DAY OF ATONEMENT
In early April, 1973, President Anwar el-Sadat, Nasir's successor
as President of Egypt told a Newsweek reporter in an interview:
"If we don't take our case into our own hands, there
will be no movement . . . (toward a permanent Middle
East solution) . . . Every door I have opened has been
slammed in my face by Israel with American bles-
sings .... The situation is hopeless . . . the time has
come for a shock , . . Everyone has fallen asleep over
the Middle East crisis . . . The Americans have left
us no other way out . . . Everything is now being
mobilized for the resumption of battle which is now
inevitable. "
Sadat's sense of frustration stemmed from the fact that despite his
agreement in principle in 1971 to continue Egypt's acceptance of the
Roger's Plan and to search for a permanent peace, Israel had made no
move to withdraw from the territory it had occupied nearly seven years
earlier. In addition, Sadat had, in 1972, expelled the Soviet military
advisors and replaced them with Egyptians. This expulsion was but the
culmination of a series of grievances with the Soviet Union, including,
among other things, the Soviet policy of "no peace, no war" along the
Suez front, the infringement of the massive Soviet railitary presence on
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Egyptian sovereignty, and the Soviet failure to provide the modern arms
1 8
requested by the Egyptians. Thus, Sadat found hiraself feeling in-
creasingly isolated from the global system, and, in the face of renewed
domestic pressure for action, more and more compelled to provide the
"shock" that he had alluded to in his interview.
Beginning in January, 1973, Egypt, and to a lesser extent, Syria,
carried out a series of mobilizations and maneuvers in the area of the
west bank of the Suez canal and the Golan Heights. Each was accompanied
by a series of Arab threats to "liberate" occupied territory. These
mobilizations were seen by Israel as part of a general campaign designed
19
to wear down the Israeli economy and morale.
The basic problem which the Arab military posturings presented to
the Israelis was that while the Egyptians maintain a large standing army,
Israel's defense forces are geared to a large reserve contingent. As a
result, continued mobilization of Israeli forces, such as the mobilization
in May, 1973, in response to Arab military activity, is very disruptive
to Israeli social and political processes. Consequently, the Israelis
became increasingly hesitant to mobilize in response to what were gen-
erally considered Arab bluffs.
The actual crisis which led to the October war began as yet another
Egyptian mobilization, announced by Cairo on 1 October, 1973. This
"practice" mobilization culminated with an attack on Israeli positions
on 6 October. In contrast to the 1967 war, therefore, the crisis period
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preceding the actual hostilities was much shorter, and the extra-regional
involvement was virtually non-existent. On 3 October, a meeting was
held at Israeli Prime Minister Meir's home in Jerusalem, at which
20
Arab intentions were discussed.
At this meeting, a preliminary decision was taken not to raobilize
the Israeli Defense Forces, considering the criticism which the May
mobilization had provoked. The general belief was that the probability
of war was quite low and that the Arabs' actions were but another exam-
ple of their program of psychological and economic pressures on the
Israelis. There was also a general feeling amongst the Israeli leader-
ship that the Soviet Union would discourage its Arab clients from a full
scale war in the interests of Soviet-American detente. (In this, they
seemed to have credited the Soviets with greater leverage over their
subsystemic clients than the United States had theretofore been able to
achieve over Israel. ) Finally, it was believed that if the Arabs did
attack, it was likely to be in the form of a limited strike, aimed at
easing Arab doraestic political pressures, and that such a strike could
easily be repelled by the IDF's standing army.
As for the nature and extent of Soviet arms in Egypt and Syria,
these were well known to both American and Israeli intelligence, how-
ever, it was felt that the Soviets would curtail their resupply of parts
and supplies if they assessed war to be imminent.
1 -^4.

On 4 October, Soviet advisors and their families vv^ere airlifted
out of Egypt, an act which did not fit into the pattern of previous Egyptian
military maneuvers. Wagner asserts that this action was made to "fit"
the perceptions of the Israeli leadership as but another manifestation of
the deteriorating Arab-Soviet relationship rather than as a prelude to
21
war. General Chaim Herzog, on the other hand, said that the Israeli
intelligence community had other thoughts on the subject:
"The explanation of all these Soviet moves by Israeli
intelligence was: either they indicated a knowledge
on the part of the Soviets that war was about to break
out (and the evacuation and naval withdrawal might
be a Soviet move designed to deter the Egyptians
from such action, since at the end of the 'year of
decision' in 1971, during a previous general mobili-
zation in Egypt, Soviet vessels had evacuated the
port of Port Said); or it might be that the Egyptians,
together with the Syrians had finally decided to
liquidate Soviet presence in Egypt, although this
did not seem very feasible. "
23
Heikal, in his book, The Road to Ramadan describes President
Sadat himself as being somewhat surprised and confused concerning the
Soviet withdrawal. According to Heikal's account, Sadat had decided to
see the Soviet ambassador, Vladimir Vinogradov, on 1 October in order
to give him a general warning that a break of the cease-fire was to take
place. Sadat had apparently decided to tell the Soviets when the attack
would occur for two reasons: (1) He did not wish to embarrass the Soviets
once the fighting had begun using weapons supplied by them by letting it
leak that they knew when the attack was planned, and (2) he feared that

the Soviets might leak the information to the United States in order for
them to put pressure on the Israelis while the Soviets pressured their
clients into not attacking.
At any rate, on Thursday, 4 October, the Soviet ambassador
returned with an urgent message from the Soviet leadership. According
to Sadat, Vinogradov conveyed Moscow's request that he "allow four big
aircraft to arrive in Egypt to fly the Soviet families out of Egypt. They
want them to land at a military airfield so as not to be seen at the inter-
national airport and to maintain secrecy. " Sadat considered this a bad
omen and was concerned about his request to the Soviets for a commit-
ment to support the Arabs in the war. This apparent lack of confidence
on the part of the Soviets was even more obvious in their action of divert-
ing a supply ship bound for Alexandria away from the Egyptian port until
Z4
it was confirmed that the Egyptians were winning.
It is possible, but not proven, that the Soviet evacuation was meant
to be a signal to the United States that war was imminent. The signal
was passed for the following reasons: (1) The Soviets doubted the Arabs-
ability to successfully conduct a major military campaign against the
Israelis. (2) In view of their already weakened position in the area,
another crushing Arab defeat, such as in 1967, would have been disas-
trous for Soviet attempts to maintain influence in the region. (3) They
could not afford politically to openly express their doubts to their clients,
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for to do so might have been interpreted as a sign that (a) The Soviet
arms transfer program was insufficient to provide an adequate capa-
bility to successfully engage Israel, or (b) they did not believe that
the Arab military forces had either the necessary expertise or the will
to fight to insure victory. (4) They hoped that the United States would
be able to pressure Israel into movement towards accommodation with
Arab demands, and thus avoid confrontation.
If, however, the Soviet move was meant as a signal, there is ample
reason to believe that it was not received by the parties to whom it was
sent. The outbreak of the war on 6 October placed the United States and
the Soviet Union in a "micro-version of their larger Prisoner's Dilemma
25
supergame in which detente represents a mildly cooperative solution. "
The choice between thera was whether to cooperate and mutually atterapt
to restrain the combatants, or to unilaterally defect and aid their respec-
tive clients. It appears that the Soviets were the first to defect by not
informing the United States in advance of the Arab intent to attack.
When the United States did find out that war was imminent -- only three
or four hours in advance -- it kept its part of the 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev
agreement by contacting the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Soviets
to see if war could be prevented. But it was too late. At eight o'clock
that morning the Syrians attacked Israel from the north and the Egyptians
27
attacked from the south. In response to Kissinger's request, Soviet
ambassador Dobrynin pledged cooperation and pledged similar efforts

to restrain the regional actors. Sadat does report Soviet pressure on
him to accept a cease-fire soon after the war had begun, but also men-
tions the Soviet pledge to construct an "air bridge" by which to mount
28
resupply operations. After the initial Arab successes, furthermore,
the Soviets "defected" at two different levels: first, by urging new Arab
states to join in the fighting, and then by increasing the rate of arms
transfers to the Arabs. The United States did not "counterdefect"
immediately to the increased Soviet participation, and, in fact, sug-
29
gested cooperation with a mutual arms embargo. After the Soviets
rejected this proposal, the United States greatly increased its shipments
30
to Israel. It was not until after the Israelis had crossed the Suez
Canal and threatened another crushing Arab defeat, that the two super-
powers began to cooperate.
On 16 October, Premier Kosygin flew to Cairo for three days of
talks, and Kissinger, at the request of the Soviets, flew to Moscow on
20 October, in order to, in Brezhnev's words, "discuss means to end
31
hostilities in the Middle East. " The result of the Moscow meeting
was the jointly sponsored UN resolution 338, which called for a cease-
fire in compliance with UN resolution 242. Although the resolution was
passed on 22 October, fighting continued, as the Israelis threatened to
destroy the surrounded Egyptian Third Army, and continued their ad-
vance on the West Bank. The Soviets considered this a United States
"defection" -- the United States had promised to control the Israelis

and was not doing so. Consequently, on 24 October, the Soviets pro-
posed joint U.S. -Soviet intervention to enforce the cease-fire, which,
in practice, would have meant jointly forcing the Israelis to pull back.
A second note was sent the same day which threatened Soviet unilateral
32
intervention if the Americans did not wish to cooperate. While it is
possible that the Soviets believed that joint intervention was in keeping
with the spirit of detente, it is unlikely that they would have believed
that the United States would agree to their unilateral intervention. It
appears that the unilateral proposal was a threat intended to get the
United States to increase pressure on the Israelis to raove back to the
cease-fire line. Whatever the Soviet intentions, however, the United
States perceived the Soviet proposals as "defection" and not "cooperation. "
As a result, the United States responded with a nuclear alert and a bluntly
33
worded warning to Brezhnev. That the nuclear alert was designed as
much to communicate American intentions to the Israelis as to the Soviets,




"The 'nuclear alert' appeared at the time to be a
deus ex machina to divert attention from the
domestic crisis of Watergate, but in truth it
was part of the elaborate game Dr. Kissinger
was playing with the Russians, the Israelis, and
the Egyptians. In subsequent conversations with
aides, Kissinger sought to justify his decision by
calling it 'our deliberate overreaction. ' He had
warned the Russians throughout the war that the
United States would not tolerate an intervention
by Soviet troops. The American alert drama-
tized that point. But the alert was aimed at
Israel as well --to manifest emphatically that,
139

whilst Washington would not countenance this
Russian threat to shed Israeli blood, Israel
must reciprocate by accepting American political
imperatives and sparing the Third Army. With-
in a day, the Russians backed off. So did the
Israelis, and the Third Army was spared. "
With the passage of Security Council resolution 339, a second cease^
fire more or less came into effect and gradually the fighting on the
Egyptian front came to an end. Fighting continued, however, on the
Syrian front, intermittently, until a cease-fire was finally achieved on
31 May, 1974.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR
If the Six Day War resulted in increased Soviet influence in the
Middle Eastern subsystem, the war of October, 1973, saw Soviet in-
fluence reach its nadir. It is interesting to note the seeming perversity
in the changing fortunes of the major systemic actors in the Middle East,
After the war of 1967, a defeat for the Soviet supplied Arabs, Soviet
influence and prestige in the region nevertheless increased. The 1973
war may be claimed as an Arab victory, and yet, the influence of the
Soviets has diminished. The reason for this apparent paradox is not
at all clear, yet it seems to be independent of the respective military
fortunes of the protagonists, and tied, instead to the regional political
subsystem.
In the 1967 war, Nasir was thrust into a conflict for which he was
ill-prepared. Consequently, American support for Israel, coupled with
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Arab public denials of defeat and the need for replenishing the Arab
arsenal, led to the emergence of the Soviet Union as the dominant
systemic power in the region. The 1973 war, on the other hand, was
undertaken for entirely different reasons. In the latter case, one of the
major objectives of the Arab leadership, notably Sadat, was to bring the
United States into closer proximity to the problem of the Arabs, specif-
ically the question of occupied territories. Consequently, despite
bellicose pronouncements to the contrary, it is probable that military
"victory" was never the goal, and consequently, a stalemated ceasefire
which had brought the United States into the conflict in the role of con-
straining its Israeli clients could easily be construed as an Arab victory,
leading to the exploitation of renewed Araerican interests in the region.
One manifestation of this renewed American interest was the "shuttle
diplomacy" undertaken by Secretary of State Kissinger, aimed at obtain-
ing a disengagement of forces and an incremental approach to a peace
35
agreement. It should be noted that Kissinger saw his Middle Eastern
diplomatic initiatives from the standpoint of global politics vis a vis the
Soviets, but yet was constrained to undertake them in consonance with
the essential rules of the subsystem.
SUBSYSTEMIC DOMINANCE
This paper has attempted to demonstrate the transforraation of the
war for Palestine from a regional conflict, peripheral to the major
channels of interaction between the essential systemic actors of the day

(and whea dealt with at all, dealt with in the terms of the global inter-
national system) to a conflict which has intimately involved the con-
temporary major bloc actors, sometimes involuntarily, and on terms
which reflect the processes and structures inherent in the regional
subsystem. Although the system of interaction between global and
regional actors is dominated by the essential rules of the subsystem,
this does not preclude shifting initiatves between the global and regional
actors as they attempt mutual exploitation.
For example, the Arabs, in initiating the 1973 war, planned to
refocus global interest on the core issue of controversy within the sub-
system -- the status of Israeli occupied territories, and the plight of
the Palestinian Arabs. They counted on the United States /Soviet Union
competition for influence in the region to prevent the destruction of their
respective client states. Consequently, they were willing to launch the
carapaign despite assymetries in the pattern of arms supplies to the
region. The Soviet program of arms transfer was not designed to
supply their Arab clients with a credible offensive posture against
Israel, while the arms transfer program of the United States to Israel
was, in fact, designed to be used to obtain an Israeli victory over the
Arabs in any probable conflict. Nevertheless, the Arabs were not
deterred from launching an all out attack against Israel, since their
own defeat was never really at risk as long as the systemic actors could




In the case of the cease-fire of 1973, however, the initiative v/as
that of the global powers. The threatened Soviet unilateral intervention
had prompted the U. S. nuclear alert and increased pressures on Israel
to cease fighting. It is conceivable that without such external pressures,
the war would have continued and grown in intensity. Had the Israeli
threat to annihilate the Arab forces proceeded unhindered by the United
States, it is likely that the Soviets would indeed have acted unilaterally.
The scenario following such an intervention could easily have involved
the deployment of American forces within the region, and the possibility
for escalation into a global nuclear conflagration.
Having hypothesized that the contemporary pattern of relations
between the global system and the Middle East regional subsystem is
subsystemically dominated, what follows is a brief outline of some of
the factors contributing to this situation.
MIDDLE EAST OIL
Although an Arab erabargo had been placed on the shipment of pet-
roleum to the West during the Six Day War, the embargo deployed during
the 1973 war was much more effective. Some of the reasons for the dif-
ference of effectiveness were that in 1967 Saudi Arabia cut off the flow
of oil involuntarily under pressure from Nasir, and consequently did
not enforce the measures as strictly as possible, and resumed shipments
as soon as possible. In 1973, on the other hand, Saudi Arabia intro-
duced the weapon of its own accord. Further, increasing governmental
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participation in the oil producing companies as well as substantial price
increases in the meantime, made it easier for the oil exporting countries
to economically weather a cut in international trade. One other factor
influencing the Saudis new willingness to use the oil weapon is that with
Nasir's death, they felt less threatened that some other Arab leader
would appropriate to himself the right to decide where and when the oil
weapon should be used.
Regardless of the proximate motivation for deciding to use the oil
weapon, once the Arab states had decided to use it, they did so most
effectively. All earlier price increases were dwarfed by those of mid-
October, 1973 which raised the posted price of marker crude from
$3. 01 per barrel to $5. 12 per barrel, and by those of late December
(effective 1 January) which raised the price to as much as $11. 65 per
barrel. Oil shipments were embargoed to the United States and to the
Netherlands, and to certain other countries. Production was cut by 25%,
and further monthly incremental cuts of 5% were threatened. Although
only the Arab producers of the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and
Abu Dhabi) fully applied the production cuts and embargo, while Libya
and Algeria applied them unevently, and Iraq hardly at all, oil supplies
in international trade nevertheless decreased from 33 million barrels
per day in September 1973, to 28. 8 million barrels per day in November
37
of that year. Although only the Arab countries, supporting the cara-
paign against Israel, fully supported the embargo and production cutbacks,
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all of the oil producing and exporting countries took advantage of the
price increases. Thus, economic forces set in motion in accordance
with the rules of the Middle Eastern subsysteiD permeated the entire
international market for petroleum, and, consequently, impinged upon
not only the major systemic actors, but other regional subsystems as
well.
It was against this background that Kissinger began his "shuttle
diplomacy. " The lifting of the oil embargo was always high on the
agenda of any talks he had with the Arab leaders. The United States'
effort to resupply Israel during the conflict had been complicated by
the reluctance of its Western European allies to provide landing rights
and logistic support for the airlift, lest they be dealt yet another blow
by the Arab oil weapon. This placed severe strain upon the NATO
alliance itself. Consequently, the oil embargo was inextricably linked
to Kissinger 's' peace initiatives.
According to Sheehan, part of the bargain that Kissinger struck with
Sadat concerning the Sinai Disengagement included an agreement that
Sadat would use his offices to attempt to persuade the oil ministries to
end the embargo. With no lifting of the embargo forthcoming, Kissinger
supposedly played "impeachment politics, " warning that a continued
embargo would so weaken the American President politically, that he
would be unable to promote peace in the region. Sheehan goes on to say
that when Saudi Foreign Minister Saqqaf and Egyptian Foreign Minister
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Fahmy visited Washington in 1974 they told Nixon and Kissinger that if
they (the U.S„) would do something for Syria, the embargo would stop.
Kissinger promised to try, and in March the Emibargo was lifted.
"Kissinger subsequently denied the 'linkage' but in fact his Syrian shuttle
38
was the price he paid to end the embargo. "
The oil politics of the early 1970's, while effective, might be com-
pared to the present day Arab econoraic leverage as barter might be
compared to today's money markets. During the embargo period, the
political leverage which was applied had to do almost exclusively with
a source of energy, for which alternatives might be substituted. As
the Western powers, either through perversity or through shortsighted-
ness failed to develop appropriate substitutes for Middle East oil, the
economic influence which the Arabs were able to exert became less and
dependent on one specific commodity, and became based, instead, upon
the influence which the newly wealthy Arab countries might exert upon
various world currencies, including the dollar itself.
To try to put the shifting econonnic locii of the world in some per-
spective, it might be useful to review some pertinent facts concerning
Arab oil wealth. In 1976 alone, the Saudi oil industry (representing 1%
of the workforce and about 90% of the Gross Domestic Product) earned
about $37.8 billion, or just over $100 million per day. At this rate,
39
the Saudis would be able to buy:
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All the stock on the United States stock exchanges (market value)
in 26 years, 5 months, 14 days.
The fortune 500 companies (total tangible net worth) in 9 years, 8
months, 9 days.
A reciprocal concept to the great deal of wealth that the oil export-
ing Arab states are ammassing is that, as more of their foreign reserve
holdings are in American dollars, the greater the interest which the
Arabs will have in maintaining the value of the dollar in the inter-
national money market. Thus the economic relationships between the
Arab world and the West have been transformed from colonial exploita-
tion, through Arab challenge, to a situation of mutual interdependence.
Therefore, although increasing systemic reliance of Middle Eastern oil
has increased the ability of the Arab oil exporting states to focus sys-
temic interest on subsystemic issues, the revenue from petroleum has
bound the exporting countries to the international monetary system, and,
in so doing, may be a major factor in constraining the petroleum export-
ers from undertaking precipitous action based upon and utilizing their
oil power.
The increasing economic strength of the Arab oil exporting countries
is not without its effect upon the world arms market, as the following
section will discuss.
ARMS TRANSFERS REVISITED
It is unlikely that the arras transfer policies of the extra-regional
suppliers did much to either incite or to prevent the outbreak of war.

Yair Evron cites the 1956 Suez conflict as the only Arab-Israeli bel-
ligerency in which arms trade (the 1955 Czech arms deal) had a major
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influence. Consequently, he doubts some of the claims that have been
made about the ability to inhibit conflict through "arms control, " if by
arms control is meant measures taken in the military sphere -- for
example, in terms of weapon systems, sizes of armies, or demilitarized
territory -- that is likely to increase the strategic stability of relations
between the states in conflict. A stable mutual deterrence system be-
tween states in conflict can contribute to that strategic stability. How-
ever, in the system of Arab-Israeli relations from 1967 to 1973, although
Israel's apparent military superiority should have provided a deterrent
vis-a-vis Egypt, a stable system of strategic relations did not emerge.
Since 1967, in fact, two difficult wars have erupted: the "war of attri-
tion" and the October 1973 war. Evron attributes the lack of strategic
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stability during this period to another factor which he calls "grievance, "
and points to the Israeli's retention of the Sinai and presence along the
Suez Canal as being the factors which resulted in an Egyptian grievance
which "transcended any possible Israeli deterrent aspect and was the
factor that undermined the system of strategic relations. The final
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result of this destabilization was the 1973 war. "
If, because of the concept of "grievance, " the relative military
positions of the regional protagonists is of minor importance in deter-
mining whether or not open hostilities arise, what influence can the

extra-regional actors exert over their arms recipients once the fighting
has begun? The 1973 war does not provide any empirical data in this
regard since, as has been demonstrated, both major suppliers "defected"
and furnished their clients with massive resupplies of arms. Since that
time, moreover, arms transfers have increased so that Israel, and to a
lesser degree some of the Arab countries may now be said to have am-
massed stockpiles of weapons upon which to draw in the event of another
round of war. Given this stockpile, it is unlikely that an extra-regional
arms embargo, alone, would result in any immediate influence over a
client state's actions. Likewise, the development of alternate sources
of supply, and in the case of Israel, the growth of an indigenous arms
industry have also increased the regional autonomy of action vis-a-vis
the systemic actors. The increasing wealth of the Arab oil exporting
states has contributed to the increasing subsystem autonomy by en-
couraging arms suppliers, notably the United States as largest consuraer
of Saudi petroleum, to use arms sales as a means of recycling petro-
dollars. Further, the purchase of sophisticated weaponry, such as the
F-15 fighter aircraft, by the Arabs, has the effect of driving down the
cost of acquisition of that system by the United States military; and, in
times of budgetary constraints, such an effect may be a powerful induce-
ment to sell such sophisticated systeins on the terms of the recipient,
43
without much concern for overall politico /military planning.
The recent controversy over the Carter administration's proposed
"package deal" of aircraft to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, is
1 AQ

demonstrative of the extent to which subsystemic influence has been able
to penetrate the American decision making process. Recent political
initiatives taken by the moderate Arab leadership, especially by Sadat,
put pressure on the administration to demonstrate some support for the
Arab position. The raanner in which this support was to be demonstrated
was through the arms transfer package. The linkages between the grow-
ing political independence of the regional actors and the United States'
response will be discussed in the following section.
SUBSYSTEMIC POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
The Arab oil embargo, Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, the election
of Israeli Prime Minister Begin, and the Sadat visit to Jerusalem, are
all manifestations of the growing political independence of the sub-
systemic actors. To an increasing degree, systemic interraction with
the Middle East subsystem occurs according to the essential behavioral
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rules of the subsystemi. Thus Sheehan points out that although Kissinger
saw his peace shuttle between the regional antagonists from a systemic
viewpoint; the position of the United States in the region relative to that
of the Soviet Union, and the elimination of the oil embargo which was
threatening the solidarity of one of the bipolar blocs; his dealings with
the regional actors took place within the context of the regional political
subsystem. As was mentioned earlier, the price of lifting the oil embargo
was his trip to Damascus, a trip suggested by the Saudis, as necessary
to keep Assad within the influence of the moderate Arab camp. Con-
sequently, much of Kissinger's time was spent re -assuring the Arab
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leaders about matters of intra-Arab rivalry and mutual distrust. As a
result, Kissinger's diplomacy proceeded on two levels. The first v/as
the containment of the Arab-Israeli conflict, while the second was the
promotion of American technology, which all the Arabs wanted, and which
45
allowed him time to work on the first problem. According to Sheehan,
he was, in effect saying to the Arabs "I know what you want -- your
territory -- and I'm working on it. Meanwhile I'll give you everything
else you want to compete in the twentieth century. " This has meant a
vast commitment to the Saudis to play a major part in fashioning their
"infrastructure" and to supply arms. For the Egyptians, this policy
has meant American diplomatic support, money, and the encouragement
of American investors and of the Arab oil exporting countries to help
rescue the Egyptian economy. It also has meant the encouragement of
Western Europe to sell arms to Sadat, and has now even involved the
United States in direct sales. This policy has been extended to the more
militant states, such as Syria and Iraq, who although they still depend
upon Soviet weapons, are beginning to import American technology.
As for his dealings with the Israelis, Kissinger's tactics to convince
them to accept the provisions of the Sinai Disengagement agreement of
1975 involved as explicit agreement that:
".
. . The United States will make every effort to
be fully responsive, within the limits of its re-
sources and congressional authorization and
appropriation, on an ongoing and long term basis,
to Israel's military equipment and other defense
requirements, to its energy requirements, and
to its economic needs.""*"

The 1977 election of Menachem Begin and his Likkud coalition to
head Israel's government was but another example of the region's grow-
ing political independence. Although Rabin has been implicated in
scandal which raay have added to voter dissatisfaction with the Labor
Party, the election of Begin was a break not only with a political party
but with a "European" political connection. Begin and his conservative
policies represent a distinctly regional approach to the problems of
regional security and have few philosophical connections to the global
system. In addition, after Begin's assumption of power, Israeli settle-
ment in occupied territory increased in pace, despite U.S. pressure to
the contrary. Once again, regional political activity is dominated by a
political philosophy which is the product of the regional political relation-
ships, as well as normatively charged with a religious tie to the land.
Consequently the odds for a negotiated settlement based on systemically
negotiated or guaranteed compromise, based on instrumental values
rather than consummatory values, appear to have diminished.
Finally, just as Sadat delivered a "shock" to the international
system in 1973 by launching a military campaign against Israel, so, too,
did he "shock" the system by his trip to Jerusalem in 1977. In Sadat's
words, in appraising the impasse in peace negotiations which had pre-
vailed since Sinai II:
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"I realized that we were about to be caught up in a
vicious circle precisely like the one we'd lived
through over the last thirty years. And the root
cause was none other than that very psychological
barrier I have referred to. "
It should be pointed out that the Sadat visit to Jerusalem followed
hard on the bilateral declaration of Carter and Brezhnev for a reconven-
ing of the Geneva Middle East Peace Conference. It is quite likely that
Sadat, seeing the problera of the Arab-Israeli conflict drifting back
toward systemic negotiations and compromise, decided to make his
trip in order to once again refocus the problem on the subsystemic level.
In doing so, he effectively "stole the thunder" from the U.S. -Soviet pro-
posal and reinforced the regional nature of the conflict and the need for
regionally derived solutions to it. He accomplished another task in his
peace initiative: by going to Israel and conceding its right to exist, he
had made a substantial concession to the Israeli position. In so doing,
and after his oft repeated remark that the United States holds "99% of
the cards, " in the search for a settlement, he has clearly placed pres-
sure on both Israel and the United States to reciprocate by making some
sort of territorial gesture to the Arab position.
After the euphoric visit to Jerusalem and talk of imminent peace,
no substantive progress was made at achieving a peace settlement. The
language used by both sides became so bitter, in fact, that Sadat broke
off negotiations. At the same tirae, Israel continued its settlement
program in the occupied territories.

Sadat's trip was roundly criticized by the more militant Arab leaders,
even before its completion. Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization, among others, severely criticized the initiative.
When no reciprocal concessions appeared to be forthcoming from the
Israelis, the United States was placed in the position of having to ex-
press some tangible support for Sadat and the Arab position. As a
result, the United States Administration agreed to the transfer of sophis-
ticated fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and, miore importantly, the
transfer of combat aircraft (F-5 Fighters) to the Egyptian government.
Whether these transfers would have been proposed without the independ-
ent political initiatives taken by Sadat, or in the context of Israeli terri-
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VII. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES
This paper has traced the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a
conflict which has never been free of linkages to extra-regional powers,
as it has evolved from a relatively siraple regional dispute involving the
Arab and Jewish population of Palestine. Upon the creation of the Jewish
State in May, 1948, the conflict spread throughout the Middle Eastern
Region. The war of 1956 transformed the conflict and linked it inextric-
ably to the rivalries of the two emerging bipolar actors. Both the Six
Day War of 1967, and to an even greater extent, the Yom Kippur War of
1973, demonstrate that the United States and the Soviet Union's systemic
competition is closely linked to the fundamental subsystemic issue of
the region: the Arab-Israeli dispute.
Coincidental to the transformation of the scope and intensity of the
dispute, has been the changing character of the international system.
Initially, the problem of Palestine could be dealt with according to the
essential rules of a "balance of power" global system. The Arab revolt
of the 1930's and the mobilization of the Jewish conflict partners posed
a challenge to the systemic dominance of the global-regional relationship.
This rather diffuse challenge was brought into focus after the creation
of the state of Israel and the emergence of independent, revolutionary
Arab regimes, such as Nasir's Egypt. In addition, the International
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systera was transformed from a balance of power system into a bipolar
system. Finally, the period fromi 1967 to the present has witnessed
the development of a subsystemically dominated system of relationships
between the region and the major systemic actors.
This trend toward subsystemic dominance was largely the result of
bipolar systemic competition within the region. As the United States
ctnd the Soviet Union each undertook the process of arming their respec-
tive clients and using the seeraingly insoluble Arab-Israeli conflict as
a means of projecting their influence into the area, they also provided
the regional actors with the means of increasing their autonomy of
action.
To begin with, the arms competition between the two raajor suppliers
led to the stockpiling of weapons by the regional recipients. This stock-
piling reduced the effectiveness which any subsequent weapons embargo
would have upon the imraediate behavior of a client state. Further, the
very fact that neither of the two superpowers was prepared to allow the
total defeat of a client contributed to the willingness of the regional
actors to use the weapons for regional political gain.
In addition, prior to the 1973 war, the pattern of interaction be-
tween the regional subsystem and the global system was bifurcated along
the lines of the regional conflict. Thus, there was little positive com-
? munication between Israel and the Soviet Union, just as the United States'
contact with the Arab confrontation states (with the possible exception of

Jordan) was generally acrimonious. These discontinuities of communica-
tion resulted in the United States and the Soviet Union having very in-
complete information about regional dynamics by which to make policy
decisions.
Finally, the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 was able to influence the
behavior of the United States not so much because of any critical short-
age of oil in the United States itself, but because it threatened to weaken
the alliance system of which the United States was the leader, and thus
increase the relative power of the Soviet alliance system.
1
The diminution of Soviet regional influence in the wake of the
October war, however, and the subsequent improved relations between
the United States and the Arab World have presented American decision
raakers with an opportunity to reverse the trend toward subsystem
dominance in its relationship with the region, and to increase the chances
for regional stability. It must be made clear, however, that this author
sees little chance of returning to the type of systemic dominance which
once prevailed during the formative years of the dispute; instead, the
best that can be accomplished is that the systemic actor can interact
freely with the subsystem and help foster an atmosphere in which the
regional actors can arrive at a solution to the problera based on the
essential subsystemic rules of behavior. The following sections will





The recent arms sales package to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel
has placed the United States in the position of supplying arms to the
two regional protagonists who have been directly involved in every Arab-
Israeli war. To those who therefore accuse America of pursuing an
amoral "raerchant of death" policy as regards arms transfers, it may
be argued that the supplying of both sides of a conflict allows the sup-
plier to tailor the arms supply program in such a way as to maintain a
measure of stability between the protagonists. An Ainerican decision
not to supply arins to Egypt, for example, may have actually increased
regional instability by (1) posing legitimacy problems for the Sadat
regime which may have resulted in the coming to power of a regime less
friendly to Western interests which would quite possibly repudiate the
current peace initiative, and seek to renew a supplier-client relationship
with the Soviet Union, or by (2) resulting in a perceived arms imbalance
such that Egypt may have felt constrained to use what weapons it had
against Israeli superiority rather than to allow its military position to
deteriorate still further. The administration's pledge to supply an ad-
2
ditional twenty F-15's to Israel upon completion of the present transfer
was used as an incentive to attain Senate approval (or, more precisely,
I lack of disapproval) of the package. This pledge may be viewed as the
beginning of another round of Middle East arms racing. There are
conditions, however, v/here such racing can have a beneficial effect.

3
Colin Gray suggests that an arms race may provide time for con-
flict resolution or amelioration processes to work. A continuing arms
race keeps alive the hope of victory tomorrow; if the parties are con-
vinced that arms -inventory improvement will yield a better outcome
should war come tomorrow, it is unlikely that there will be a war today.
This is not to suggest that arms transfer policy is capable of solving
the dispute, but it may increase the probability "the systena will retain
4
its principal feature. "
A danger in the United States pursuing a policy of arms transfers
to both sides of the conflict is that it may become a convenient issue
for domestic political advantage. If pursued properly, however, it
may counter some of the effects of weapons stockpiling, and enhance
the United States' ability to, if not prevent, at least limit future armed
conflicts between the regional actors.
NEED FOR AN AMERICAN ENERGY POLICY
5
In a recent interview, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd, while refusing to
link Saudi policy on the dollar and oil prices with the recent aircraft sale,
was critical of the U.S. administration for failing to cope with America's
energy problems:
"We will do our best to help the U.S. and our other
friends in meeting their requirements and overcom-
ing whatever difficulties they may have in this
respect. As you know, we decide on the quantity
of our oil production according to world need. But
the so-called energy crisis is not connected only
to the volume of oil production. For example,
the U. S.
,
the largest oil consuming nation in the

world, so far does not have any national energy-
policy. So far as we are concerned, we are
always willing to participate effectively in solv-
ing any so-called energy crisis, but we cannot
shoulder all the responsibility. "
The creation of a national energy policy would have two salutory
effects: first, it would, in fact, lessen actual American dependence
upon foreign sources of energy, sources which themselves are limited;
and second, it would increase Arab trust in the United States as an
"honest broker" in the regional dispute. By being able to divorce the
current "even handedness" of Araerican Middle East policy from a
growing dependence on Arab oil, the United States would be able to res-
pond to those Arab states who remain distrustful of American motives
and intentions. Of at least equal importance, such a policy would help
to allay the fears of many Israelis as well as large segments of the
American political community who feel that U.S. pressure upon Israel
to make territorial concessions is motivated primarily by the need to
court the favor of the Arab oil exporting states, and that the American
commitment to Israeli security, once the concessions have been made,
might be bargained away for a barrel of oil. Consequently, a strong
American energy policy which incorporated petroleum conservation
measures with a search for alternative energy sources would have the
effect of in fact reducing the amount of dominance which the subsystem
is able to exert over the conduct of American foreign policy, and result
in the increased credibility of U.S. regional peace promoting efforts
on both sides of the dispute.
1 AA

PROSPECTS FOR AN ARAB - ISRAELI PEACE
This paper began with a brief survey of the cognitive aspects of the
Arab-Israeli dilemma. For the most part, the current dispute is still
normatively charged with many of the same issues which were mentioned
in that chapter: Historical destiny, Religious irrendentism, and Mutual
non-recognition. Only recently has progress been made toward the
lessening of the mutual non-recognition aspect of the dilemma. On
20 November, 1977, Sadat said to the Israeli Knesset:
"In all sincerity I tell you we welcome you among
us with full security and safety. This in itself is
a tremendous turning point, one of the landmarks
of a decisive historical change. We used to reject
you. We had our reasons and our fears, yes.
"We refused to meet with you anywhere, yes.
"We were together in international conferences and
organizations and our representatives did not, and
still do not, exchange greetings with you. Yes.
This has happened and is still happening.
"It is true also that we used to set as a precondition
for any negotiations with you a mediator who would
meet separately with each party ....
"Yet today I tell you, and I declare it to the whole
world, that we accept to live with you in per-
manent peace based on justice. "
Since that act of mutual recognition, the peace process has once
again come to an impasse. Given the current trends in the system of
relationship between the regional and systemic actors, what role is
the United States able to perform in the peace process? To begin with,
systemic actors are no longer able to dominate the regional subsystem
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as they were during the formative years of the dispute. Consequently,
the prospects for achieving peace through the reconvening of the Geneva
Peace Conference, under the auspices of corapeting systemic actors,
and in accordance with the essential rules of a bipolar international
system, are not encouraging. Instead, the United States, recognizing
the subsystemic nature of the dispute can at best hope to influence the
parties to it to resume direct negotiations aimed at an eventual, region-
ally derived settlement.
Such a comprehensive settlement is not likely in the near future.
However it is possible that the United States, through policies such as
those outlined above, and through other diplomatic and symbolic initia-
tives in the region may be able to "keep the lid on" the conflict long
enough for genuine concessions to be made by both sides in an atmos-
phere of mutual security.
The era of direct negotiations between the subsystemic conflict
partners has raised the expectations of both sides for some movement
toward conflict resolution. If such movement does not occur soon, it
may be impossible to prevent yet another bloody war in the region.
Sadat has already warned that the October 1973 war may not have been
the last if Israel "continues seeking land, expansion, and part of (Arab)
sovereignty. " His peace initiative, he said, implied that the 1973 war
would be the last, but it would not be, if Israel holds "its hard line and
7does not share in the responsibility of peace. " Sadat has also made
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repeated references to the September, 1978 expiration of the American
inspired Sinai II disengagement agreement, and his recent actions to
suppress his domestic critics suggest the distinct probability that if his
political position within Egypt is seriously threatened, he may once
again focus internal dissention upon an external eneiny.
The task facing the United States, therefore, is to recognize the
fact that conflict resolution within the Middle Eastern subsystem is
totally dominated by the essential behavioral rules within that subsystem,
and the concomitant limitations of systemic actors to directly influence
the behavior of the regional actors. By making clear to the regional
actors its understanding of the need for regional solutions to regional
conflicts, and by its willingness to help foster an atmosphere of mutual
security in which the subsystemic rules can operate, will the United
States take best advantage of its historic opportunity.

NOTES - VII
1. Galia Golan, Yom Kippur and After (Cambridge: Cainbridge
University Press, 1977), pp. 247-250.
2. Time (22 May 1978), p. 17.
3. Colin Gray, "Arms Races and International Stability, " in
Sheffer, ed. pp. 62-63.
4. John W. Spanier, Games Nations Play (London: Nelson, 1972),
p. 125.
5. Time (22 May 1978), p. 18.
6. New York Times (21 November 1977).
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